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ABSTRACT 
Previous research suggested that subjects tend to investigate a 
potentially multiply caused event by initially exploring the most 
likely cause. Such search was said to be "truncated" in that it did 
not go on to explore additonal causes if the involvement of the 
initially hypothesized cause was demonstrated. It was suggested that 
this search strategy led to subjects' encountering a narrow range of 
information which would not allow them to adequately understand such 
an event. 
The present study allowed subjects to investigate three hypoth-
esized causes of an event by sequentially selecting three separate 
pieces of information. Subjects could choose to investigate the same 
cause or a different one at each question selection. Perceived like-
lihood of all hypothesized causes was measured before and after each 
new piece of information was encountered. After all information was 
selected, additional measures were taken, two of which called for the 
subject to interpret the information received. 
The information available was confirmatory with respect to all 
three causes, although the nature of the task only allowed subjects 
to be certain of the involvement of one . Depending on the three pieces 
of information selected, subjects' feedback ranged between solid proof 
of one cause's involvement with no information about others, to proof 
of one cause with information making other cause likely, but not certain. 
Results indicated that there was a tendenc y for subjects to 
truncate search. In addition, most subjects, regardless of the scope of 
information encountered, agreed with a statement which implied that only 
a single cause was operating. Subjects also felt that they completely 
understood why the hypothesized event occurred, even though it was 
impossible to have thoroughly explored all three causes. 
These result are seen to be the result of an initial set of 
"sufficiency" assumptions. Specifically it is suggested that subjects 
seek only to account for the event and encountered information, and to do 
so as parsimoniously as possible. 
It is argued that the appropriateness of this strategy largely 
depends upon the cost of an incomplete understanding of the event. 
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Introduction 
It has long been accepted that rationalistic methods of 
arriving at conclusions are easily distorted so as to 
support the prejudices of the individu~l. More recently,it 
has become clear that even empirical criteria do not 
guarantee accuracy~ Data are often selectively perceived or 
recalled if they conform t~ the expectations of the subject. 
Thus, the more data the .subject collects, the easier it 
becomes for him to discover "illusory correlations"i.e., to 
' 
perceive nonexistent relationships in the data 
(Smedslund,1963; Chapman & Chapman,1967,. In addition, even 
scrupulously recorded data are often accepted or rejected 
according to inconsistent ("double") standards (e.g., 
Crary,1966; !arkus,1977; Shrauger & Lund,1975,. Results 
which are pleasing may be readily accepted, whereas 
discordant finding~ may be d~saissed as being the work of 
extraneous variables. Apparently it is always possible ~o 
maintain a belief in a discredited hypothesis ceteris 
paribus (Lakatos,1970). Psychological research demonstrates 
this trend in its reluctance . to embrace experimental 
findings which fail to reject the null hypothesis 
(Greenwald,1975) ,so much so that McGuire (1973) has 
commented that many experimenters act as though their job 
vas that of "demonstrating that an obviously true hypothesis 
is correct"(p.449). 
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These errors may be attributable to the fact that data 
collection is usually guided by a particular hypothesis 
(Elstein. Shulman. & Sprafda .1978) and may involv9 a 
co■■itment to that hypothesis. Thus the basis of these 
distortions of the empirical method is the presence of 
pre-existing bias. and is therefore within the long 
tradition in psychology of ascribing error to motivational 
forces (e.g. Freud.1917). 
Current studies.however. have tended to liken human thought 
processes to those of the computer (Newell & Simon.1972). 
and to favour mechanical.rather than clinical. explanations 
of error (e.g. Nor•an.1979). While it is clear that in the 
applied setting. strict impartiality will seldom be found. 
(e.g. ~itroff.1974).the conclusion of recent cognitive 
theorists is that even in the absence of motivational bias. 
human thought does not necessarily follow the prescriptions 
of logic (e.g. Kunreuther & Slovic.1978). It has been 
suggested that the origin of errors of reasoning lies in the 
fact that human problem solving makes use of generalized. 
"rule of thumb" strategies rather than precise algorithms 
(Tversky & Kahne■an.1973; Tversky s Kahneman.1974). These 
simplified procedure~. or "heuristics"•• although normally 
extremely efficient under certain conditions are said to 
result in significant inaccuracy. 
Within the hypothesis-testing literature. one such heuristic 
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has been identified. usaally referred to as "confirmatory 
bias" or "confirmatory hypothesis testing" (Doherty, ~ynatt, 
Tweney. & Schiavo,i979; Johnson- Liard & Wason,,977; Mynatt, 
Doherty & Tweney.1977; Snyder & Swann,1978; Wason.i968) 
Although the definition of th1s hearistic has varied 
somewhat, it is perhaps most clearly stated as a strategy of 
information search ,whereby hypotheses are tested by 
observing whether or not events predicted by the hypothesis 
in question do, in fact, occur. This may be constrasted with 
a strategy of searching for even~s which are incompatible 
with the hypothesis. One consequence of confirmatory search 
is that only a li■ited aaoant of hypothesis specific 
i~formation will be collected. Also, implicit in this 
definition is that search terminates after some number of 
confirmations of the hypothesis have occurred, i.e., when it 
is considered to be "proved." 
In almost every instance where confirmation bias has been 
reported. emphasis has been placed on its inappropriateness. 
For example. a specific weakness of this approach is that it 
may tend to be self-fulfilling when the information is 
gathered by interacting with another person. This is because 
the person being questioned is likely to alter his responses 
in line with the confirmatory expectations of the questioner 
(Snyder & Swann,,978 ). 
~ore generally, a confirmatory approach to hypothesis 
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testing has been objected to on logical grounds. 
Popper(1959) noted that although inconsistent results 
clearly indicate that a hypothesis is false, results which 
are in accord with expectations, do not offer similarly 
conclusive proof that the hypothesis is correct. It is 
argued that since any number of successful confirmations can 
not unequivocally show a hypothesis to be true, 
experimenters should ,instead, attempt to falsify their 
hypotheses. 
This criticism of confirmatory approaches, however, has 
itself been criticized on philosophical grounds (e.g. 
Quine,1953; Feyerabend,1975). It is even less pursuasive on 
a practical level where the aim is to be able to make 
reasonably likely, rather than certain ,conclusions based on 
some limited amount of investigation. In a Bayesian sense, 
sach successful prediction increases the probability that 
the hypothesis is true. Although one prediction may be of 
only trivial importance, successive predictions . of events, 
each of which has a low baseline probability of occurring, 
may provide a very good approximation to certainty. In fact, 
the effectiveness of the falsification ·strategy has been 
shown to be inferior to naturally occurring confirmatory 
approaches (~ynatt, Doherty, & Tweney,1978; Tveney, Doherty, 
Worner, Pliske & Mynatt,1980). Thus, confirmatory hypothesis 
testing ,like other heuristics, is probably a generally 
efficient strategy. 
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There are. however. certain situations in which an incorrect 
hypothesis might receive successive confirmations • • For 
example. this would be likely in a limited testing 
situation, if the incorrect and true hypotheses both implied 
the same sort of things. as in the case of two diseases with 
si ■ilar symptomatology. 
Even in the case of an unlimited search (i.e.,whei any 
number of predictions may be investigated). repeated 
misleading confir■ations will still occur if the 
tested(incorrect} hypothesis is a subset of the true one. An 
example of this is provided by iason (1968) vho instructed 
subjects to test their hypotheses about a rule governing the 
generation of a sequence of numbers (e.g. 2-4-6). The 
correct rule, ("any three numbers in ascending order"), was 
very general;however most subjects selected for testing a 
hypothesis which was some subset of this(e.g. "three 
positive numbers with the second number being twice the 
first, and the third number three times the first"). It 
should be noted that every number sequence generated by such 
a subset hypothesis,vill be confirmed(i.e., will receive 
feedback that it is consistent vith the true rule,. 
A similar relationship often occurs in those situations 
where the event to be explained has a number of potential 
causes which are not incompatible with one another. If a 
number of causes were simultaneously operating, then an 
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hypothesis about the involvement of any one of them would 
again be a subset of the correct hypothesis, and thus 
subject to repeated confirmation. 
The confirmation of subset hypotheses is not, in itself, 
inappropriate,since it implies only the possible involvement 
of the hypothesized factor. Error results only if the 
assumption is made that the tested hypothesis fully 
characterizes the true one. In behavioral teras, this 
corresponds to a termination of information search after on~ 
hypothesis has been ex~ensively supported. It should be 
e ■phasized that this termination would result not from an 
inability to generate appropriate alternatives (e.g. Pitz. 
Sachs & Heerboth, 1980) • but rather because available 
alternatives were ignored. 
There are a number of studies in other fields that seem to 
suggest that subjects do not consider alternatives if the 
one under consideration seems tenable. This seems to be a 
factor in explaining the general tendency to be 
overconfident about the correctness of current knowledge 
(Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff,1980) , and to see the 
occurrence of known past events as having been easily 
predicable (Slovic & Fischhoff,1977). 
It is also analogous to what has been termed the 
"win-stay,lose-shift" strategy in concept identification 
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studies (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,1956; Levine,1966; 
Wickens 6 Killvard,1971). In these studies, subjects 
retained a hypothesis under consideration as long as it led 
to correct predictions, but adopted a new one if it did not. 
Similarly, Gettys and Fisher (1979) found that the addition 
of a new hypothesis to a pre-existing set depended upon it 
being at least half as plausible as the most plausible 
hypothesis currently in the set. Presumably then, subjects 
with a highly plausible hypothesis would be less inclined to 
add new ones .. 
None of these studies are directly relevant to a criticism 
of confirmatory search, however, since they do not deal with 
the situation where the hypothesis under consideration is 
both subject to repeated confirmation(or otherwise made to 
appear certain), and yet potentially incorrect. One study 
that does meet these criteria is wason•s (1968) "2-4-6" 
task. Subject were told that they could test their 
hypotheses as long as they wished, but that they were not to 
announce their conclusion until they were certain that they 
were correct. The general finding was that this announcement 
(and thus certainty), followed from repeated confirmation of 
a single hypothesis. This then, suggests the weakness of 
confirmatory search in the detection of extremely general 
causes .. 
The other case in which an incomplete hypothesis will be 
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repeatedly confirmed, that of the multiply caused event, has 
not been vell studied, but there are suggestions that the 
same premature elimination of other hypotheses also occurs. 
This issue vas examined most directly by Shaklee and 
Fischhoff (1982). Subjects were told of a number of events, 
and given three causes of each event to consider. rwo of 
each of the three causes were designated as "pot~ntial" 
causes, whereas the third was labelled a "known" cause ( 
i.e., definitely involvedt. Subjects were instructed to 
choose from among the three questions (one of which provided 
information about each caase) that question that they would 
most like answered in trying to explain each event. Results 
indicated that most subjects (across all events) picked the 
"known" cause to inquire about significantly more often than 
any of the other "potential" causes. This vas interpreted as 
an unwillingness to explore additional causes given the 
certainty of one- a process referred to in the paper as 
"truncated search." 
These results,however,are open to an alternative 
interpretation. Presumably, subjects who truncated their 
search did so because they felt that the potential causes 
did not require investigation. If so, such a subject would 
have nothing to gain fro■ asking any question, since those 
relating to other causes would be deemed irrelevant whereas 
information about the "known" cause would be se~n as 
redundant. Thus, it could be argued that , if subjects were 
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forced to choose, all questions should have an equal chance 
of selection , since they would all be considered to be 
equally uninformative. 
On the other hand, siaply being told that a factor was a 
"known" cause may not ~ave generated certainty about the 
involvement of that factor in the minds of the subjects. If 
this were the case, the decision to ask about the "known" 
cause may have been an attempt to personally validate this 
conclusion, and as such, would represent a propensity to 
clarify the role of the most likely hypothesis as a first 
step, a strategy referred to by Shaklee and Fischhoff as 
"serial search." From this point of view, the question of 
whether there would have been further exploration was not 
answered. 
A pilot study was conducted by the author to further examine 
this issue. Subjects were presented with a scenario which 
contained information about a man g9tting to work each 
■orning, and were asked to generate factors that might 
reasonably be expected to cause him to be late_ Each factor 
was assigned a probability value according to its perceived 
liklihood of occurring. The scenario was constructed in such 
a way that one particular hypothesis was mentioned by almost 
all subjects. Subjects were then told that the man in the 
scenario actually was late and inforaation was then provided 
in stages, each stag~ presenting evidence which further 
supported the involvement of the salient hypothesis but was 
to all others. 
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Subjects assigned new largely irrelevant 
probabilities to 
also given the 
each hypothesis at every stage. and were 
opportunity to add new hypotheses or 
eliminate any that, in the light of current information, no 
longer seemed worthy of further consideration. The final 
piece of information implied the certain involvement of the 
salient hypothesis. Since hypotheses were generally 
independent of one another (e.g. "alarm fails to go off," 
"car does not work properly"), no hypotheses should have 
been eliminated since they were all initially thought to be 
reasonably likely, and should have remained so. On the other 
hand, if a truncated search was being employed, the subject 
should have, by the final stage, lost interest in all but 
the then certain hypothesis. Results indicated that very few 
subjects retained all their initial hypotheses, and that 
49.5% of the sample had no alternatives left after the final 
stage_ This figure is a conservative one in that some of the 
additional hypotheses were very close in ■eaning to the 
targeted one, and thus at least partially supported by the 
sequential information. If such overlapping hypotheses were 
not counted, then the percentage of subjects having no 
alternatives rose to 57.s,. Furthermore, not all subjects 
perceived ~he targeted hypothesis as certain (i.e., assigned 
it a value of 1.00) at the final stage. If these subjects 
were eliminated from the sample then the figures would be 
62.71 and 74.S~ respectively for the two definitions. To 
some extent, the converse relationship vas also observed, 
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i4e., subjects whos9 most probable hypothesis was relatively 
low were somewhat more likely to ada new hypotheses to the 
set. This finding is similar ~o that reported by Gettys and 
Fisher (1979). 
This investigation,however, involvea a number of design 
weaknesses~ For example, by controlling the information that 
the subject received, there was no opportunity for the 
subject to display a non~confirmatory search pattern. In 
other words,the subject vas not free to choose information 
that might have falsified his hypothesis. It is also 
possible that this design gave rise to demand 
characteristics which suggested that alternative hypotheses 
should be ignored. There are also several problems which 
stem fro• the fact that subjects generated their own 
hypotheses. Those with larger numbers of initial hypotheses 
may have been more Likely to ~~iainate some of them but less 
likely to eliminate all of them. Also there was no control 
over the specificity of hypotheses. Thus, one subject may 
have hypothesized "flat tire" as a cause of someone being 
late, whereas another may have simply been testing for 
"transportation difficulties." Bartlett (1958) suggests that 
extended problem solving activities are avoided by 
redefining open, general questions( e.g. "what is wrong with 
this patient?") to more specific formulations (e.g. "is 
ane■ia present?"). The latter form of the question proYides 
a vell- defined stopping point for the inYestigation. and 
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thus would be expected to lead to earlier termination of 
search. 
Another 
work of 
difficulty is that neither the pilot study nor the 
Shaklee and Fischhoff gives any indication why 
alternative hypotheses are overlooked. Shaklee and Fischhoff 
state that the significance of truncated search is that th9 
investigator who ases it " ••• risks overlooking other potent 
influences on the event of concern" and " ••• will judge 
cause-effect relationships on the basis of a narrow subset 
of the potentially relevant information 11 (p.1s,. This seems 
to imply that it is the absence of complete information per 
se which leads to 4ifficulties. However,limited information 
per se can only lead to difficulties if the investigator 
chooses to judge it as adequate~ conversely,e~en complete 
infor■ation may not lead to correct solutions if certain 
aspects of it are ignored- Clearly there must be some 
pre-existing reason why a truncated search is employed and 
this, rather than the resultant narrow scope of search, must 
be considered the more fundamental cause. 
Two processes in particular suggest themselves as likely 
explanations. It is possible that subjects were making the 
assumption that only one cause could be operating~ rhis 
would seem to explain the logical fallacy of "affir■ing the 
consequent" (e.g. Copi,1978) in which a person given the 
premises "if P ,then Q" and" Q ," incorrectly concludes" 
p . 
" 
This deduction woald be 
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correct only if the first 
premise 
only one 
vas "if and only if P ,then Q ," i.e., there can be 
cause of Q. This assumption would also be 
consistent with the widespread and often mistaken tendency 
,in argument, for people to treat the other person's point 
of view as contrary, i.e., to assume that the simultaneous 
validity of both arguments is impossible. 
This "predudice that a phenomenon can not have more than one 
cause" was mentioned (as a criticism of Bacon) by John 
Stuart Mill (1843,1974) and has in recent works gone under 
the labels of "misguided parsi■ony" (Kanouse,1972) and the 
nhydraulic" model of causation (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
Nisbett & Ross suggest that studies on perceived intrinsic 
versus extrinsic motivation (e.g. Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 
1973) demonstrate that subjects see these two types of 
causes as being mutually exclusive. 
It has also been noted that there is a tendency to formulate 
theoretical hypotheses in overly simple terms, not taking 
into account,among other other things, the possibility that 
more than one cause may be operating (Petrinovich,1979). 
Stronger experimental support for the employment of a single 
cause assumption can be seen in the work of Elstein et al 
(1978). This study described the problem solving activities 
of physicians attempting to arrive at correct diagnoses. In 
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one case, the correct diagnosis involved two disease 
processes. ~ost doctors, in the course of their 
investigation, happened upon the symptoms of both illnesses. 
The major di agnostic error found, however, was termed 
"overinterpretation," defined as "treating noncontributory 
cues as relevant to a particular hypothesis" (p.107). Thus, 
rather than hypothesize about the existence of a second 
disease proce _ss, a single disease was said to account for 
all the data collected. !t could be argued that ~he 
phenomenon which led to "overinterpretation" errors at the 
integration stage, might also, in a differently structured 
task, cause a premature termination of information search. 
Another way of explaining why subjects might choose to 
ignore additional causes would be to assume that they were 
adopting a "satisficing" mode of operation (Simon,1961). 
Simon argued that peopla _ do not strive for optimal or 
maximizing solutions , but rather for ones which are "good 
enough." Simon (1981) suggests that subjects go though 
several "generate - test" cycles in which alternatives are 
generated and then tested against various satisficing 
requirements. Testing is said to terminate when an 
alternative is able to meet these requirements. Thus n ••• the 
expected length of search for an alternative meeting 
specified standards of acceptability, depends on how high 
the standards are set,but it depends hardly at all on th~ 
total size of the aniverse to be searched. The time required 
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for a search through a haystack for a needle sharp enough to 
sev vith, depends on the densi~y of sharp needles, but not 
on the total size of the stack" (Simon,1981,p.140). 
Simon's conception of satisficin~ seems to differ from other 
types of heuristics in that it is assumed that this strategy 
is resorted to consciously because of the impossibility of 
finding an optimal solution. 
Within the context of multiple causation, an optimal 
solution would clearly be one which accurately identifies 
all involved factors. A satisficing solution however, is 
likely to be that which, in itself, would be "good enough" 
to account for the resultant effect, i.e., a single 
sufficient factor. 
In conclusion then, the literature suggests that not all 
causes of a ■uliply caused event will be explored, and it is 
reasonable to assuae that some sort of single cause or 
sufficiency heuristic determines this tendency to truncate 
search. If so, the judged adequacy of causal information 
should also reflect this heuristic, and should not be 
strongly influenced by the amount of information received. 
In view of this,the following study study atte■pted to 
achieve four objectives. The first objective was to describe 
search tendencies, and to see whether the truncated search 
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phenomenon could be replicated. The second vas to see hov 
adequate subjects would judge the information acquired 
during the search to be. The third intention vas to examine 
these adequacy judgements as a function of subjects• scop~ 
of search (i.e •• how many bypotheses had been in•estigated~. 
Lastly.since it vas expected that subjects would pay 
inadequate attention to alternative hypotheses. it vas hoped 
that some light could be shed on the reasons for this 
behavior. 
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Method 
Subjects 
A total of 355 undergraduates at the University of Rhode 
Island participated in the two parts of this study. All 
subjects volunteered so as to obtain extra credit in an 
introductory psychology course. The first portion of the 
study was based upon the responses of 1~7 subjects, while 
the second employed the responses of 190 subjects. Results 
from nine subjects in each section were eliminated due to 
inconsistencies in their responses which suggested that they 
had not properly understood the instructions. Both samples 
were predominantly female ( 100 out of 147, and 132 out of 
190, respectively), which reflected the population of 
students in these classes (67 percent female). The average 
age of subjects was 18.62 years in the first part of the 
study and 19.16 years in the second. 
Analyses of these figures revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the groups in terms of 
discard rate (chi-square= .28,df=1,n.s.), or ratio of males 
to fe■ales(chi-square=.08,df=1,n.s.). The difference in mean 
age between the samples was statistically significant, 
(t=2.14,df=335,p<.OS), but of little practical importance. 
This is especially so in light of the fact that the older 
sample was recruited approximately three months later within 
the same academic year, and therefore probably stood in the 
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same relation,relative to the class as a vhole,as did the 
earlier group of subjects. 
Subsequent analyses have assumed that these two samples were 
essentially equivalent. 
Procedure 
A comaon procedure vas followed in both conditions. 
subjects were asked to select a single booklet from one of 
several stacks.each of which was said to contain a different 
type of form. A different identifying letter appeared on the 
cover sheet of each of the booklets in the different stacks. 
This was meant to emphasize the point later made in the 
instructions that many types of forms were being used which 
varied in the aaoant and sufficiency of information they 
contained~ In fact, no such differences existed, but it was 
intended that subjects understand that the information 
provided to them was not necessarily wholly adeq .uate. 
Sabjects were told that they would be presented with an 
event and three potential causes of that event, and tha~ 
their task was ~o determine the involvement of those causes, 
as best as possible, within the limitations of the 
information provided by the booklet selected~ To this end, 
subjects were told that they would be given an opportunity 
to select, from a variety of questions, those which they 
deemed most important to have answered. It was stated that 
the results of their inquiries would be highly 
individualistic depending, as they did, both on the type of 
booklet and the questions selected. It vas 
explained,hovever, that this did not matter since the 
experimenter's major concern was to see what effect the 
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information selected voald have on their estimation of the 
likelihood of involvement of a particular cause. 
By way of illustration.subjects were asked to generate 
possible causes of an event, (a student failing to show up 
for his final examination,• and practice was given in rating 
each cause according to how likely it seemed that it vas 
involved in causing the event. New information was then 
introduced and it was clearly demonstrated that such 
information ,depending upon its relationship to the 
hypothesis in question, may make the hypothesis appear to be 
more likely, less likely, or ( if totally irrelevent) 
unchanged fros its former rating. Subjects were told that 
the hypotheses that they had generated for this 
demonstration would be used in subsequent administrations of 
this task, and that those which they would themselves 
encounter had been suggested by previous subjects. The 
purpose of this deception was to emphasize that the task was 
not an experimenter designed "test," and thus make more 
believable the assertion that there was no one "right"ansver 
for which they should be looking. 
After the completion of the instructions, subjects began 
work on the task by following the directions specified in 
their booklet (a copy of which appears in the Appendix). All 
booklets described the same event:that of a forgign student 
in America who did poorly on a mid-term exam and was in 
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danger of failing the final ,and having,as a result,to leave 
the university and return to his native coun~ry; and three 
possible causes of that event :lack of interest in the 
subject matter, inability to understand the English used in 
lectures, and poor health. These causes will be referred to 
as A, B and c respectively. It was stated that all other 
possible causes had been raled out and that only these three 
needed to be considered. 
Instructions then called for each hypothesis to be evaluated 
as to its perceived likelihood of involvement in causing the 
described event. All ratings were made on separate 
evaluation sheets. Each sheet contained three continuous 
lines,four inches in length, marked off at the extremes by 
the words "impossible" and "certain," with the word 
"neutral" appearing at the mid-point. Each line appeared 
next to a short description of one of the hypotheses, and 
subjects were asked to rate by making a mark on each line.. 
In addition to these ratings, the evaluation sheet also 
called for subjects to indicate if they felt, in a practical 
sense and regardless of the rating given, that they had 
already made up their mind, one way or another about the 
hypothesis' involveaent. 
then Three questions were 
pertaining directly to one 
subjects explanations. The 
presented. each 
of the three 
were asked to 
obviously 
possible 
choose that 
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question deemed most helpful in determining vhy the 
described event occurred4 After receiving the answer to the 
selected question, subjects were again asked to evaluate 
each of the listed hypotheses. 
This question-evaluation cycle was repeated until a total of 
three questions were selected and four evaluations were 
made, (each on a separate evaluation sheet). No matter which 
question vas selected at a given stage, all subjects were 
offered the same choice of new questions at the subsequent 
stage. Also. no matter which choice was made. the answer to 
the question always provided confirmat i on for the relevan~ 
hypothesis. The strength of the confirming information was 
meant to increase at each stage, with the final piece of 
information making the aypothesis appear virtually certain. 
Subjects were given control over question selection by means 
of a 41 page "scrambled" booklet containing the 
instructions. questions and confirmatory answers , as well 
as some misleading information. Differences in question 
selection were accommodated by referring each question 
selected to a different page in the book for further 
information. All pages were randomly distributed throughout 
the booklet. Thus it was unlikely that subjects ,casually 
flipping to the referred page, would haYe been able to find 
answers to specific questions 
Moreover.the misleading pieces 
pages ostensibly not intended 
which were not selected. 
of information(printed on 
to be seen)vere stated in 
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negative terms so as to prevent subjects vho nevertheless 
did see the■ fro■ assuming that they would necessarily have 
all their questions answered in an affir■ative ■anner. 
After the completion of the final evaluation, subjects were 
directed to 
first asked 
answer four further items in the booklet. The 
subjects to rate the potential usefulness of 
information which might derive from a series of additional 
questions. although no actual infor■ation was made 
available4 The questions included one relevant to each of 
the hypotheses as well ~s three arbitrary questions. This 
has subsequently been referred to as the Usefulness 
variable. 
A second item(ter■ed Opiniont then asked subjects t o 
indicate their degree of agreement with a conclusion stated 
in the form " ~ f T ha~ no1 occurred, the event would not 
have occurred." where Twas the hypothesis presumably made 
certain by the third piece of information. The exact wording 
of this question vas somewhat differen t in the two parts of 
the study. In the first part, the sentence used was" If T 
had not occurred, the student would not have done poorly on 
the mid-term exam ." In the second part of the study, the 
last part of the sentence vas changed to "would have done 
well on the ■id-term exam." 
The third ite■ (referred to as the Recoamend variablet 
page 24 
consisted of two questions,one to be answered by those who 
felt that they had acqaired a complete understanding as to 
why the event occurred, and one by those who did not feel 
that they had such an understanding. Subjects were 
instructed to read both questions and choose the one which 
best described their opinion. The former group was then 
asked to suggest actions which the student described in the 
scenario should take so as to guarantee that he would not 
fail his final exam. The latter group was asked to indicatg 
what additional information they would have required for a 
complete understanding of t he event. 
The final item consisted of tvo questions (both of which had 
to be answered) which directly asked the subject to indicate 
what effect knowing of the definite involvement of the" T" 
cause would have on tha likelihood of occurrence of the 
other two potential causes, in the case of some other 
foreign student. 
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Design 
The major restrictions observed in the design of the booklet 
infor■ation involved the attempted conditional independence 
of potential causes (or at least the absence of any negative 
association such that the occurrence of one would have made 
the involvement of another less likely), as well as the 
specificity of new information made available. Thus the 
answers to questions selected on each hypothesis were always 
confirmatory of only that specific hypothesis and largely 
irrelevant to the others. 
Although the same basic information vas used in both parts 
of the study, differences existed in the description of the 
severity of the event. In the first part, the student vas 
simply described as having done "poorly" on the mid-term 
exam, and in danger of failing the final( and thus having to 
leave the university), The description was thus 
"categorical" in nature, telling subjects only that his 
performance had been unsatisfactory, but giving no 
indication of his standing within that category. 
In the booklet used in the second par~ of the study, th~ 
student vas now described as having done "extremely poorly" 
(with the word "extremely" printed in block letters), and a 
sentence was aaded which stated that his grade had been "the 
lowest in the class." All subsequent references to the 
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student's performance within the booklet vere altered to 
remind subjects of the extent of the academic difficultiesr 
( e.g. references to the student doing "poorly" were changed 
to "so poorly" etc.). With the exception of these changesr 
and the previously mentioned wording alteration in one other 
questionr the booklets used in the two parts of the study 
were identical. 
For ease of referencer the booklets used in the first and 
second part of the study will be referred to as th~ 
categorical and quantitatiYe forms respectively. 
Results will be reported 
addresses one aspect of 
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Results 
in six sections.each of which 
the analysis. The first examined 
whether search was confirmatory and whether this resulted in 
an (at least initial) narrowing of the investigation(i.e •• 
serial search), The second section reported whether the 
results of the first section persisted after certainty had 
been achieved (i.e •• truncated search). 
A truncated search implies not only that alternatives are 
ignored • but also that the scope of search has been 
restricted~ sections three through five looked at three 
other measures of subjects• treatment of alternatives 
(Ratings. Opinion and Recommend responses), and included an 
examination of the effect of scope of search on each 
measure. The final section investigated the relationship 
among measures. 
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Confiraatory Search Patterns: 
I: Association betveen Rank and Question Selection 
Confirmatory search should have tended to focus information 
search on one target hypothesis. A subject should therefore 
haYe attempted to confirm his hypothesis by choosing the 
question relevant to it. Since the information received vas 
supportive in all cases, the same hypothesis should have 
been retained and this should have led to the choosing of a 
question pertaining to the same hypothesis at subsequent 
selections. 
It vas found that 25.21 and 27.4$ of the categorical and 
quantitative samples respectively behaved in this 
manner(i.e., chose all three questions relevant to one 
hypothesis). Since the difference between the groups was not 
significant (Pearson Chi-sguare=.21,df.=1,n.s.), the samples 
were combined giving a total rate of 26.4i. In all, 27 
search patterns vere possible, and this total rate, which 
represented only three of those patterns( AAA, BBB, CCC) was 
significantly higher than the 11.1, that vould have been 
expected if subjects had chosen questions randomly at each 
stage (Pearson Chi-sguare=79.85,df.=1,p<.001). 
The degree to which subjects engaged in this type of 
restricted search,although directly related to the practical 
issue of access to information about other possible causes, 
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vas only in part a measure of the tendency to seek 
confirmation. Since no formal means vere taken to equate 
questions with regard to the perceived amount and 
helpfulness of information that they provided, the selection 
of one question over another must be presumed to have been 
affected not only by the subject's strategy but also by the 
relative attractiveness of the questions available. In fact, 
it would have been possible to have produced restricted 
search in all subjects simply by making the questions 
relating to some specific hypothesis relatively more 
interesting than any of the other questions at each stage. 
A more appropriate test of confirm~tory search would be to 
compare the conditional probabilities of subjects choosing a 
particular 
expectation 
hypothesis 
relating to 
hypothesis. 
question 
would be 
I should 
X than 
given their choice of hypotheses. The 
that a subject entertaining a single 
be more likely to select the question 
those who were not considering this 
The hypothesis under consideration vas inferred from the 
subject's ratings. The distance of the subject's marks on 
each line was measured in units of one sixteenth of an inch, 
giving 
from O 
a scale 
to 64. 
with at least ordinal properties, ranging 
By dealing only with those cases in which 
there were no ties in the ratings at any given stage, it was 
possible to rank hypotheses in terms of their relative 
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likelihood of having been under active consideration. It was 
further assumed that ,for the vast majority of these 
subjects ,only a single hypothesis was being investigated at 
any one time. This followed not only from the lack of tied 
ratings, but also fro■ findings to this effect by Tweney 
Doherty, Worner, Pliske s Mynatt (1980). 
The following analyses aade use of all subjects (whose 
ratings vere not tied) no matter hov extreme their ratings. 
The assumption made here was that a subject vho rated a 
hypothesis extreaely highly, and also indicated that he had 
already decided on that hypothesis' involvement, would 
nevertheless still have a high probability of choosing the 
guestion relating to that hypothesis. This issue is 
discussed in further detail in the next section. 
The relationship between a hypothesis's ranking and question 
selection vas analyzed separately for each hypothesis, 
although the data for all hypotheses appear in Table 1. An 
examination of the first two columns of Table 1 gives the 
results for the A hypothesis (student had no interest in the 
subject matter). the probability of choosing question A, as 
opposed to either questions B or c (denoted as "other"), vas 
always highest vhen hypothesis A was ranked highest. this 
result held across all rating stages and booklet forms( 
i.e., categorical 
but one(the third 
or guantitatiYe). Moreover, in all cases 
stage in the guantitative form), the 
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Table 1 
Frequencies of Various Question Selections by Booklet 
Fo rm , Ques t ion Selection Stage, and Hypo t hesis Rank 
Question 
Fo r m Stage Rank A Other B Ot her C Other 
1 10 9 20 72 10 1 
1 2 21 24 1 23 28 25 
3 16 42 1 5 15 43 
Cate - 1 16 11 40 10 7 38 
gorica l 
2 2 5 22 38 19 5 33 
3 4 64 5 10 2 37 
1 19 4 39 42 10 9 
3 2 12 20 5 29 14 43 
3 21 47 0 8 3 44 
1 12 10 27 94 13 4 
1 2 23 25 1 30 40 41 
3 28 62 0 8 16 46 
1 15 12 65 6 18 39 
Quanti- 2 2 4 38 38 30 1 44 
tative 
3 6 80 7 9 1 52 
1 16 8 57 56 11 15 
3 2 17 30 6 26 7 77 
3 38 54 4 14 7 46 
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probability of choosing question A vas also higher when the 
hypothesis was ranked second than when it was seen as being 
least likely. 
The A data in Table 1 { Form type by hypothe~is Rank by 
Question selected by selection Stage), was subjected to log 
·linear a~alysis by program BMDP4F (Dixon,1981). The best 
fit to the data vas given by the model: FRS, RQS~ 
(likelihood ratio Chi•sqaare=4.99,p=.8356, Pearson 
Chi-sguare=4.97,p=.8368,df=9,. 
The FRS interaction results from the fact that the Question 
selected was treated as a response variable. All log-linear 
' 
analyses will follow the practice of reporting only higher 
order terms ,using the first letter of the variable to 
represent it . Thus QSR represents a second order interaction 
among the variables Question selected, Stage and Rank, and 
includes all lover order terms QS, QR, RS, Q, see the 
section on log-linear analysis in the Appendix for a more 
detailed explanation of this technique. 
The most interesting interpretation of this model is that 
the relationship between hypothesis rank and question 
selected, although significant , differed in its level of 
association across the ranking stages. In other words, the 
rank:question relationship at the first stage was not 
necessarily equal to the relationship between these 
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variables at the second or third stages. The type of form 
used seeaed not to have been important. 
The estimated odds of choosing the A question, calculated 
fro■ the above aodel, are shown in the first section of 
Table 2. It is clear from these results that the second 
order interaction is aue to the fact that, at the first 
stage,the odds in favour of choosing the A question when A 
vas ranked highest are relatively close to those for when A 
was ranked second. In other words,although being ranked 
highest always leads to the greatest probability of 
selecting the hypothesis-specific question at all stages, 
this tendency ,for the A data, is somewhat less at the first 
stage. 
There is some evidence 
somewhat aabiguous, and 
above finding. 
that the stags one A question was 
this may have contributed to the 
Examination of the data for the Band c hypotheses in Tables 
1 (poor English comprehension,illness), revealed the same 
pattern of ordered conditional probabilities already noted 
for the A data. The only exceptions to this finding with 
regard to the B hypothesis (second and third columns) 
occurred in the reversal of the second and third rankings in 
the first stage of the categorical form and the third stage 
of the quantitative form. For the c data, the only reversal 
occurred between the second and third rankings at the third 
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Table 2 
Estimated Odds in Favor of Choosing Questions A, B, and C 
by Hypothesis Rank and Question Selection Stage 
Stage 
Rank 1 2 3 
A Question Selected 
1 1.16 1 1.35 1 2.92 1 
2 .90 1 .15 1 .58 1 
3 .42 1 .07 1 .58 1 
B Question Selected 
1 .28 1 6.63 1 .9 9 1 
2 
. 06 1 1.46 : 1 .22 1 
3 .03 1 .80 : 1 .12 1 
C Question Selected 
1 4.19 1 .33 1 .88 1 
2 .96 1 .08 1 . 20 1 
3 .39 1 .03 1 . 08 1 
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stage in the quantitative fora. When subjected to separate 
log -li~ear analyses (Stage by Rank by Form by Question 
selected).it vas found that the model: PRs. QS. QR fit both 
sets of data. The likelihood ratio Chi-square and Pearson 
Chi-square.for the B data vere 12.82(p=-4621.df=13), and 
13.84(p=.3849) respectively. The same statistics for the c 
hypothesis data were 19.84(p=.0992) and 
19.39(p=.1115.df=13). 
ls in the previous case, a significant rank by question 
interaction was discovered. unaffected by form type. In 
these instances ,however, no differences in this 
relationship vere found across the stages. The QS terms in 
the B and c models reflect the fact that ~he relative 
attractiveness of the questions relating to B and c 
questions respectively were not constant across all stages. 
!he estimated odds in favour of choosing the 
hypothesis-specific question .based on the appropriate 
■odels for the B and c data, are shown in the second and 
third sections of Table 2 respectively. These results show 
the same ordered relationship between odds and rank at each 
stage. In both the Band c data. the difference betvegn the 
odds of the first and second ranked hypotheses was always 
greater than the corresponding difference between the second 
and third ranked hypotheses. 
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Further evidence for confirmatory search was found by 
examining the relationship of hypothesis rank to rated 
usefulness of additionally offered information. It will be 
recalled that after the completion of the final rating. 
subjects were asked to rate six additional questions from 1 
(totally useless) to S(essential) according to how necessary 
it would be to know the answer to each so as to understand· 
why the event described in the scenario occurred. one 
question related to each of the three hypotheses. while the 
other three questions offered information that was largely 
irrelevant to any of the■• 
In the first analysis. the rated usefulness of the question 
about the A hypothesis was the dependent variable in a 
two-vay ANOVA (form type by rank). There were three levels 
of the rank dimension, corresponding to whether the A 
hypothesis was ranked highest, second, or third at the final 
rating stage~ Subjects with tied ratings for any pair of 
hypotheses were excluded from the analysis. 
The results indicated that there were significant 
differences in perceiYed usefulness of the A information 
(P(2,267)=6.52.p<.01). fhe form effect and form by rank 
interaction were not statistically significant 
(P(1,267)=.29,n.s. and F(2,267,=.27,n.s~ respectively). 
Newman Keuls follow-up tests were performed on the rank 
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diaension (collapsed oYer form). Results indicated that 
subjects who bad rated the A hypothesis most highly at the 
final stage felt that further information about that 
hypothesis would be more useful than those subjects who had 
rated the A hypothesis second or third(p<.01). There were no 
significant differences between the second and third ranked 
groups. 
These analyses were repeated for the B and c relevant 
information. In both cases, the results were similar to 
those just reported; a significant rank effect, with no 
significant effects due to form or the interaction form by 
rank. The B data values were F(2,267)=4.61,p<.01, 
F(1,267)=1.03,n.s. and P(2,267)=.03,n.s. respectively. 
Because the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met 
with the c data, a critical value with 1 and (n-1) degrees 
of freedom was used for the P statistics (Winer,1971,p.206). 
The corresponding values for the c data were (using the 
harmonic n) P(1,39)=30.77,p<.01, P(1,39)=.16,n.s. and 
P(1,39)=1.09,n.s. 
In both the Band c data the first rank was significantly 
different froa either the second or third (p<.01) but the 
Newman- Keuls tests on the c data differed in shoving a 
significant difference between the second and third ranked 
groups (p<.05). The B data however, like that relating to 
the A information, showed no such differences and there was 
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in fact a (nonsignificant) reversal in the means between 
these tvo groups( i.e~, the second ranked groups rated the 
information to be less useful than did the third group) . It 
would appear that the aajor distinction with regard to 
perceived usefulness of additional hypothesis-specific 
information was between those who ranked that hypothesis 
most highly and those who did noto 
II: Serial search 
Subjects demonstrated a tendency to choose questions 
relating to their highest ranked hypotheses. It was expected 
that, since all questions gave confirmatory answers, this 
should have led to a tendency to stay with the same 
hypothesis across question selections. 
A four•vay log-linear analysis ( Initial question by second 
question by Third question by booklet For■) resulted in the 
following model: IST • P • (likelihood ra-tio 
Chi•square=22.79,p=.5897, Pearson 
Chi-square=20.36,p=.7280,df.=25) The data appear in Table 3. 
Each of the three questions selected had some relation to 
the others but not all 2•vay relationships vere egual at all 
levels of the third variable. As before, no differences were 
noted between booklet forms. 
In general, the results indicated that subjects vho selected 
a particular question at one stage were significantly mor~ 
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Table 3 
Frequencies of Various Question Selections at Each Question 
Selection Stage by Booklet Form (N=337) 
Form 
Third Second Initial 
Selection Selection Selection Categorical Quantitative 
A 17 14 
A B 2 1 
C 4 2 
A 9 18 
A B B 5 8 
C 26 31 
A 0 2 
C B 0 1 
C 2 2 
A 2 4 
A B 0 1 
C 3 2 
A 17 26 
B B B 14 22 
C 13 21 
A 2 1 
C B 0 0 
C 1 1 
A 1 2 
A B 1 1 
C 1 1 
A 6 6 
C B B 4 1 
C 7 5 
A 2 1 
C B 2 0 
C 6 16 
likely to 
hypothesis 
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choose the question relating to ~he same 
at the subsequent stage. The three way 
interaction term in the model stems from the fact that, not 
only is the probability of choosing a question at the third 
stage higher for those who chose it at the second stage, but 
it is higher yet for those who also chose it at the first 
stage. The implications of this finding are discussed 
further in a later section. 
These data then, argue for a tendency for subjects to 
confine their information · search to a single hypothesis,that 
which is considered ■ost likely. This tendency appeared to 
operate to the same extent in both booklet for• types. 
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Truncated Search: 
The previous section presented evidence that subjects tended 
to confine their information search to a single hypothesis, 
given the confirmation of that hypothesis. If,hovever, the 
subject became convinced of that hypothesis' involvement 
,there would be no disadvantage to dropping ~hat line of 
questioning and switching to investigate the role of some 
other potential cause. Although the infor■ation provided vas 
structured so that certainty of involve■ent was not 
generally apparent until the final piece of information, 
some subjects did indicate that they were certain before 
that time, and their subsequent question selections provided 
a means to examine this issue. 
Before examining this problem directly, it should be noted 
that there has already been some evidence,presented in the 
preYious section , suggesting that subjects do not proceed 
to investigate other hypotheses once they become certain of 
one. This conclusion can be inferred from two sets of 
evidence. 
First,there is the fact that no inter-stage differences were 
noted (at least for the Band c data) vith regard to the 
relationship between hypothesis ranking and question 
selection. This would not have been expected given that the 
proportion of "certain" hypotheses clearly increased from 
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stage to stage (due to the accumulation of information as 
well as increased strength of confirmation at each stage). 
Even the A data, which did show inter-stage differences, 
provided little support. Since "certain" hypotheses were 
very likely to have been ranked highest, they should have 
had the effect of reducing the difference in conditional 
probabilities between the _ first and second ranked 
hypotheses. In the A data however, the inter-stage 
difference lies in the fa=t that the stage one results (with 
fewest "certain" hypotheses) shoved smaller differences 
between the first and second ranks when compared with the 
results at the second and third stages. 
The second piece of indirect evidence can be seen in the 
second order interaction noted in the relationship between 
questions selected. It was found that the probability of 
choosing so■e specific question at the third (final) 
selection was higher for those who had chosen that question 
at the second stage, and among those subjects. higher still 
for those who had also chosen it at the first selection. 
Thus a subject whose first tvo questions were BB had a 
better chance of choosing B again than if his first tvo 
questions had been AB or CB. These results vere again not 
what would have been expected if "certain" hypotheses were 
abandoned, since it is likely that the BB group ,for 
example, had a higher proportion of subjects who wer~ 
certain about B than did the AB or CB groups~ !o test this, 
page 43 
certainty was defined as being rated at least 61 (out of 64• 
in addition to 
practical doabt. 
as a 
being 
The 
three 
(separately) marked as being beyond 
data which appear in Table 4, ver9 
way contingency table (Certainty by analyzed 
Hypothesis by Number explored •• Since all subjects in this 
analysis chose the same hypothesis to explore at the second 
and third selections (denoted by the Hypothesis variable), 
the total nu■ ber of hypotheses explored vas either one or 
tvo depending upon the first selection. Treating Certainty 
as a response variable, the model NH,NC,BC was found to fit 
the data, (likelihood ratio Chi-square=1.96,p=.3749, 
Chi-square=1.61,p=.446.df=2). Aside from the fact that the B 
hypothesis produced aore certainty than did the A 
hypothesis, the model indicates that there vas a 
significantly higher probability of certainty among subjects 
who had only expl,red a single hypothesis. 
A direct test of the effects of certainty was made by 
comparing the conditional probabilities of choosing a 
hypothesis-specific question for hypotheses deemed certain 
with the corresponding probabilities for those that were 
not. The definition of certainty was as above , vith th~ 
added restriction that neither of the subject's (same stage> 
alternative hypotheses met any of the requirements of 
certainty. In order to avoid extremely unreliable 
esti■ates,hypotheses vere examined only if at least ten 
subjects found it to be certain as judged by these 
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Table 4 
Frequencies of Hypotheses Rated Certain by Third Question 
Selected and Number of Hypotheses Explored for Subjects. 
Hypothesis 
A 
B 
C 
Who Explored the Same Hypothesis 
at the Second and Third Stages (N=l80) 
Number Explored 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Yes 
3 
1 
19 
23 
6 
0 
Certain 
No 
28 
8 
17 
54 
16 
5 
page 45 
standards. Only one hypothesis aet these criteria at each 
stage. 
These are presented, collapsed over form type, in Table 5. 
Comparison figures were provided by subjects, all of whom 
had distinct( i.e., no~ tied) ratings, ranked highest to 
l~west, with no hypotheses meeting any of the criteria of 
certainty. 
As can be seen , the probability of a subject choosing a 
question relating to a hypothesis considered certain, tended 
to be about the same (stage 2), or higher(stages 1 and 3) 
than if the hypothesis was rated highest, but not certain. 
Thus,sabjects, when certain of a hypothesis• involvement, 
did not shift away from that hypothesis in order to explore 
alternative hypotheses. 
This same issue was also addressed by comparing the mean 
rated usefulness of additional information for subjects who 
had indicated, at the final stage, that they were certain of 
a hypothesis• involvement with those 
definitions and restrictions vere as 
analysis. 
who were not. All 
in the previous 
Three two-way ANOVAs (for■ type by rank) were conducted, one 
for each of the hypothesis-specific pieces of information. 
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Table 5 
Freq ue nc i es of Hypo t h e s i s Specific Qu estion Selections for 
So mea Hypothese s Containing Certain Ratings at Various 
Rating St a ges 
Ques t ion Sel ectionC 
Rati n gb 
Hypothesis 
Specific NOT 
Stage 1 B Hypothes i s 
Ce rt ai n 5( . 38) 8( . 62) 
Highes t 35(.20) 138( . 80) 
Secon d · 2(.05) 40( . 95) 
Third 1 ( . 09) 1 0( . 91 ) 
Stage 2 C Hypo t hesis 
Certain 4( . 19) 17( . 81 ) 
Highest 12(.20) 47( . 80) 
Second 5( . 08) 58(.92) 
Third 2( . 03) 61(.97) 
Stage 3 B Hypothe si s 
Cer t a i n 42(.59) 29( . 41) 
Highe s t 28( . 44) 36(.56) 
Second 8 (. 19) 34( . 81) 
Thi r d 2 ( . 15) 11( . 85) 
aHyp o th e se s were included on l y if at least 1 0 subjects 
rated it certain. 
bRank among remaining noncertain hypotheses 
cRow p r obabilities appear in brackets 
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The rank dimension thus consisted of four levels, those that 
had a single "certain" hypothesis, and three groups without 
any "certain" hypotheses, distinguished by the relative 
standing of their hypotheses at the final stage. The form 
and Rank by For■ interaction values for the A data were 
F(1,71)=1.95,n.s. and F(3,71)=.54,n.s. respectively~ The 
corresponding figures for the B data were P(1,146)=.01,n.s. 
and F(J,146)=.29,.n.s. In addition, there were no 
significant differences among ranks with regard to the rated 
usefulness of the A and B data (F(3,71)=.99,n.s. and 
F(J,146)=.68,n.s respectively). Moreover, the trsnd of the 
■eans of the "non-certain" groups are not consistent with 
previous findings~ The second ranked group in the A data has 
a higher mean than that of the highest ranked, and in the B 
data, the order of all three means is exactly opposite to 
expectation (see Table 6t. 
These findings, however, aay not be as inconsistent as they 
first appear. First, the means of the "non-certain" groups 
are very close to one another, and it is not at all clear 
that this trend would be maintained or prove to be 
statistically significant if a larger sample were available. 
Second, these "non-certain" comparison groups may consist of 
somewhat atypical subjects, since they are composed of that 
151 of the total sample that had not decided on the 
certainty of any of their hypotheses after receiving three 
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Table 6 
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Ratingsa of 
Usefulness of Additional Hypothesis 
Specific Information 
Information Booklet 
Type Form Hypothesis Rank Mean S.D. n 
Certain 2.60 1.43 10 
Categorical First 2.40 1.17 10 
Second 2.17 .75 6 
Third 2.50 1.29 4 
A 
Certain 3.29 .69 17 
Quantitative First 2.62 1.04 13 
Second 2.88 1.46 8 
Third 2.36 .92 11 
Certain 2.98 1.08 41 
First 2.83 1.17 6 
Categorical Second 2.71 .76 7 
B Third 3.00 1. 29 7 
Certain 3.11 1.00 61 
Quantitative First 2 . 60 .97 10 
Second 2.92 .76 13 
Third 2.78 .67 9 
Certain 4.47 .52 15 
Categorical First 4.25 .50 4 
Second 3.71 .7 6 7 
Third 3.89 .78 9 
C 
Certain 4.92 .28 13 
Quantitative First 4 .67 .so 9 
Second 4.00 .63 11 
Third 3.58 .79 12 
aRating ranged from l(useless)to S(essential). 
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pieces of confirmatory information. As such, their responses 
may not necessarily be representative. 
Most i■portant,hovever, is the fact that in both the A and B 
data the "certain" group means were higher than those of any 
other • In addition, the differences between the "certain" 
groups and the others were always larger than any 
intra("non-certain") group differences. 
The data relating to the c information again displayed the 
highest mean usefulness ratings for the "certain" group, and 
this ti■e significant differences between the groups vere 
found (F(3,J2i=12.59,p<.01) although the form and 
interaction effects vere not significant (F(1,72)=2.11,n.s. 
and P(3,72)=1.7~,n.s respectively). Revman- Keuls tests 
indicated that the "certain" and highest ranked 
"non-certain" groups were indistinguishable, bat that both 
vere significantly different from the second and third 
ranked groups (p<.01). These latter two groups were also 
found to be indistinguishable. 
once again ,then there is no indication that deciding on the 
certainty of a hypothesis' involveaent in any vay reduces 
the interest in acquiring further information about that 
hypothesis. 
The interval-level properties of the usefulness ratings also 
page 50 
allow an opportunity to adjust for differences in the 
quality of information offered. Thus,it is possible to 
discover what percentage of subjects with "certain" 
hypotheses at the final rating would be most interested in 
further information about that hypothesis ,given the 
availability of other pieces of infor■ation of equal 
inherent attractiveness. 
Subjects vere first divided according to final question 
selection and 
larger groups 
These groups 
then random deletion was performed on the 
until all three . groups were of equal size. 
were then coabined, and their responses were 
used to estimate the means and standard deviations of each 
of the three hypothesis-specific usefulness questions. These 
figures were, in turn, used to produce standard scores for 
all subjects used in the analysis. 
subjects were included in this analysis if they had decided 
that only one of their hypotheses was certain at the final 
rating. The definition of certainty used here was the 
presence of both an indication of practical certainty and a 
rating of at least ~a. Within the saaple as a whole,244 
subjects had at least one hypothesis that met this 
definition at the final rating and 218 subjects had only ona 
such hypothesis. The additional criterion for inclusion in 
this analysis was that neither of the subjects• alternative 
hypotheses ■et either of the criteria for certainty. 
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The response variable, Match, referred to whether the 
highest standardized usefulness score vas that belonging to 
the certain hypothesis. Form and Hypothesis marked certain 
vere analyzed as explanatory variables. The r~sulting model: 
PB,! vas found to have a likelihood ratio Chi-square of 8.23 
(df=S,p=.1438) and a Pearson Chi-sguare of 7.9,(p=.1613). 
The data appear in Table 7. 
Thus the Match variable vas unaffected by fora or hypothesis 
type , and in general 57.6~ of subjects were found to rat~ 
information 
useful than 
hypotheses. 
relating to their certain hypothesis to be more 
that relating to either of their non-certain 
This figure is well in excess of the 33.31 that 
would have resulted from random selection among three 
choices. Rationally, it aight be expected that subjects with 
only a single certain hypothesis and two alternatives vhich 
were far from certain, would be most likely to expand their 
information search. Prior results however indicate that just 
the opposite is true, and thus it is likely that this 57.61 
figure represents, for the three choice case, an upper limit 
on the tendency to ignore information relating to 
alternatives, at least when information about those 
alternatives is explicit and readily available. 
If the inclination to narrow information search is strongest 
vhen there is only one highly rated or certain hypothesis, 
it should be expected that the tendency to rate more highly 
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Table 7 
Frequencies of Usefulness Variable Matching Responses for 
Subjects With a Single Certain Hypothesis 
by Booklet Form, and Hypothesis (N=l 77) 
Form 
Categorical 
Quantitiative 
Match 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Hypothesis Rated Certain 
A 
12 
14 
5 
15 
B 
21 
19 
30 
34 
C 
4 
10 
3 
10 
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information relevant to the highest hypothesis should •ary 
as a function of the namber of hypotheses explored. Those 
who investigated only a single hypothesisrfor exa■pler 
should be more likely to have rated that hypothesis as 
certain and less likely to have so rated alternatives. 
To test this, all subjects ,except those with tied ratings, 
were classified according to whether they had explored one 
,tvor or all three hypotheses. A subject was considered to 
have chosen 
standardized 
■atching information if the most highly rated 
usefulness score was that relating to the 
highest rated hypothesis. The results, shown in Table 8, 
indicated that although all groups . had above chance levels 
of matching responses, there was a tendency for matching to 
increase vhen fever hypotheses were explored. This trend 
just missss statistical significance (Pearson 
Chi-square=5.495.df=2,p=.06t. If the first question selected 
was ignored however, and subjects classified only as to 
whether the sa■e hypothesis vas explored at both the second 
and third selections,statistical significance was achie•ed. 
The data ,shown in Table 9, have a Chi-square valae of 6.148 
(df=1,p=.013t. 
A corollary of these 
certain responses at 
different distribution 
did,a result already 
results is 
the final 
that subjects with no 
rating should have had a 
of search patterns from those who 
shown in the special case of data in 
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Table 8 
Frequencies of Matching Usefulness Variable Responses 
by Number of Hypotheses Explored 
Match 
No 
Yes 
TOTAL 
Number of Hypotheses Explored 
1 2 3 Total 
33 
55 
88 
Table 9 
78 
84 
162 
35 
27 
62 
146 
166 
312 
Frequencies of Matching Usefulness Variable Responses 
by Similarity of Last Two Hypotheses Explored 
Match 
No 
Yes 
TOTAL 
Last Two Hypotheses 
-----
Same Different 
72 
105 
177 
74 
61 
135 
Total 
146 
166 
312 
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Table 4. The data,shovn in Table 10, are highly significant 
(Pearson Chi-square=63.06,df=6,p<.oo,,. They indicate that 
those vith no certain ratings were more likely to haYe 
investigated all three hypotheses and less likely to have 
investigated one or tvo, relatiYe to those vho ended up with 
a single certain rating. In fact. the largest group of those 
vho investigated all hypotheses (43.81 , had no certain 
ratings. 
Alternatively,if only the last two questions selected were 
used to classify subjects (see Table 11) an equally clear 
pattern emerges. Investigation of the sa•e hypothesis at 
both the second and third selections vas associated with the 
certain rating of a single hypothesis. Investigation of 
different hypotheses led to greater proportions of subjects 
with multiple certain ratings and with no certain ratings. 
In spite of this, a multiple certain rating was always a 
less common response than one that indicated no certainty. 
In summary then, the tendency to investigate a single 
hypothesis is not apparently affected by becoming certain of 
the involvement of that hypothesis. Even after certainty is 
arrived at.subjects still have a tendency to seek further 
information about it rather than exploring information 
relevant to alternative hypotheses. 
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Table 10 
Frequencies of Number of Hypotheses Rated Certain 
by Number of Hypotheses Explored 
Number of Number of Hypotheses Explored a 
Certain Hypotheses 
1 2 3 
0 16( . 18) 42( . 25) 35(.44) 
1 71 (.80) 120( . 71) 27(.34) 
2 2(.02) 6(.04) · 10( . 12) 
3 0( . 00) 0(.00) 8(.10) 
TOTAL 89 168 80 
Table 11 
Frequencies of Number of Hypotheses Rated Certain 
. by Similarity of Last Two Questions Selected 
Questions a Last Two 
Total 
93 
218 
18 
8 
337 
Number of Certain 
Hypotheses Same Different Total 
0 28(.16) 65(.42) 93 
1 150(.83) 68( . 43) 218 
2 2(.01) 16(.10) 18 
3 0(.00) 8(.05) 8 
TOTAL 180 157 337 
a Column probabilities (rounded to two decimal places) 
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Evaluation of Alternatives; 
I: Ratings 
Another ■eans of investigating a subjects•s tendency to be 
content vith incomplete evidence, involves examining changes 
in ratings, fro■ one stage to another, for hypotheses other 
than the one confir■ed by the intervening question 
information. 
l piece of evidence vas considered to have had a 
confirmatory effect if it produced an increase in the rating 
of the targeted hypothesis of at least four units from one 
rating to another,or if the resultant rating vas at least 
sixty-two units • An alternative was considered to have 
increased or decreased if the change in ratings between 
stages was at least four units higher or lover respectively. 
If there were less than four units change in either 
direction, the rating of that hypothesis was considered to 
have stayed the same. Analysis was restricted to those cases 
in which the infor■ation had a confirmatory effect (as 
defined above) and all alternative hypotheses were 
originally rated between four and sixty units. 
A four way log-linear analysis vas conducted (Change by Pora 
type by Stage by confir■ed Hypotheses). Since each subject 
had tvo alternative hypotheses to consider at each stage, 
the change variable was divided into six categories 
I 
i 
: 
. 
I 
--- ------..-= .... ====:;-7 
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corresponding to all possible coabinations;both increase,one 
increase:one decrease,one same:one increase, both same,one 
same:one decrease,both decrease. The data appear in Table 
12. Since the major purpose of this analysis was to 
inYestigate the effect of Stage, Hypothesis confirmed and 
Pora type on the ratings of alternative hypotheses (Change}, 
these former variables vere specified as explanatory and 
thus the FSH interaction tera vas included in all models. A 
constant of .5 vas added to each cell in order to eliminate 
the increase:increase zero submarginal. Using this approach, 
the model PSR, c,vith 85 degrees of freedoa, was found to 
provide an acceptable fit to the data. The likelihood ratio 
Chi-square and Pearson Chi-square were 89.28 (p=.3542) and 
85.7S(p=.4568) respectively. 
This outcome means that there vas a distinct tendency, 
unaffected by form,confiraed hypothesis, or stage, to rate 
alternatives lower. A more precise description of this 
tendency can be found by comparing the estimated odds. If 
the probability of an alternative being rated higher or 
lover, given change, were the same, the odds of a 
saae:decrease response would be even with respect to 
sa■e:increase. In fact the odds in favour of the 
same:decrease pattern were 3.02:1. Similarly the odds in 
favoar of a decrease:decrease response as compared with an 
increase in both alternatives, vere 8.68:1. 
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It could be argued that the reason subjects lowered the 
ratings of their alternati•e hypotheses was because th9 
hypotheses were actually incompatible. Thus, it may have 
been the case that,in spite of the experimenter's efforts to 
the contrary, subjects deaaed these particular causes to be 
mutually exclusive or at least negatively associated with 
one another. 
The conditional independence of hypotheses was directly 
exa■ined. Each subject was, at the end of the task, asked to 
indicate, in the case of some other hypothetical foreign 
student, vhat effect the known certainty of hypothesis T 
would have on the likelihood of occurrence of the tvo 
alternative hypotheses. The T hypothesis vas that one 
confiraed by the final piece of information. Thus ,each 
subject answered two questions. In addition, there were 
three classes of subjects depending on their final question 
selection. 
Even though these tvo conditional independence questions 
were answered af~er coapletion of the ratings, and ■ay have 
been influenced by them, they can also be interpreted as 
causal variables affecting the direction of alternative 
hypotheses ratings. 
Subjects were asked to indicate whether the alternative 
hypothesis in question would become more likely, be 
I 
I 
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unchanged, become less likely or be rendered impossible 
given the certainty of the hypothesis confirmed by the final 
question selection. Oving to the fact that the "impossible" 
response was rarely indicated ( a point which will be taken 
up further in a later section), such responses as did occur, 
vere combined vith the "less likely" category. 
It would be necessary to find that a large nuaber of 
subjects chose the "less likely" response if the results of 
the previous section were to be explained in terms of 
perceived incoapatibility of specific hypotheses. In fact, 
the modal category in all cases vas that of "no change" 
(i.e., independence) , and in all but two situations (the 
effects on B given A, and the effects on c given 
B)deviations fro■ independence were biased in favour of the 
"more likely" response. There vere no differences in 
response patterns between for■ types. The Chi-square values 
for the Form by Independence response tables, all of which 
had two degrees of freedom, vere .16,2.3,1.1,1.5,.37, and 
.68 for the effects on B given A, c given A, A given B, c 
given B, A given c, and B given C respectively. 
The relationship between these conditional independence 
questions and actual change in ratings was examined for 
differences which occurred as a result of the final piece of 
information; the one which was intended to make the 
confirmed hypothesis appear certain. Definitions of rating 
! 
' 
! 
i 
. 
: 
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change and restrictions on subject selection vere as stated 
in the previous section. Thus, for example, one table 
consisted of a crosstabalation of subjects• estimation of 
the effects on B given that 1 was certain against those 
subjects• actual changes in ratings for the B hypothesis 
which occurred when A was confirmed at the final stage. Each 
of the six tables had four degrees of freedom. In order to 
control the cumulative Type 1 error rate ,all analyses were 
conducted at the .01 leYel of signifance. None of the 
Chi-square Yalues vere statistically significant. The values 
were 3.88,6.36,11.28,6.67,11.26, and 3.85 respectively for 
the tables; B given A, : giYen A, A given B, C given B, A 
given c and B given c. 
Tvo tables, A given B, and 1 given c would have been 
significant at the .OS level. If subjects• notions of 
conditional dependence vere influencing their ratings, it 
would have been expected that those who thought ,for 
example, that A vas less likely giYen B, would have been 
more inclined to actually rate l lower vhen B was confiraed. 
This pattern would have produced a positive valued Gamma 
statistic (Goodman & Kruskal,1954,1963). In the case of 
these nearly significant tables however, the Gamma values 
vere negative, although not significantly so. The Gamma 
Yalues and their corresponding "t" scores were -.183 and 
-1.211 for the A given B table, and -.384 and -1.338 for the 
A given C table. In all six tables, however, the majority of 
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subjects vho had decreased the rating of their alternatiYe 
hypotheses, had indicated in the conditional independence 
questions, that these hypotheses should have been unaffected 
or more highly rated. 
It should also be noted that the lack of relationship 
betveen these two measures was not necessarily influenced by 
the amount of increase in the confirmed hypothesis. The 
conditional indepepdence question assumed that the confirmed 
hypothesis had become certain, and for a large number of 
subjects the final piece of information had just this 
effect, and thus the measures should be comparable. For 
those subjects, whose confirmed hypotheses increased in 
perceived likelihood but did not attain certainty, the 
condition should not be fundamentally different. For 
example, a subject who indicated that hypothesis K vould 
become ~~ess likel ·" giYen the certainty of hypothesis 
T,should, if a continuous scale were available,make a 
response somewhere between "no chacge" and "less likely" if 
hyp~thesis T had increased in likelihood ,but not to the 
point of certainty. On a discrete scale, this would manifest 
itself in an increase in the number of subjects expecting 
"no change." Since this "regression" type effect should 
operate to the same extent if the expected effect on 
hypothesis K were toward "more likelJ," the overall cell 
proportions would be unaffected. 
The main point though, is that any redistribution that 
: 
I 
' ! 
' 
I 
: 
i 
: 
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increased the number of "no change" responses underaines 
even further the explanatory power of perceived conditional 
dependence vith regard to decreases in the ratings of 
alternative hypotheses~ 
It would still be possible to argue that the decrease in the 
ratings of alternative hypotheses was an artifact of the 
experimental task deriving froe the na~ure of the 
information made available at each stage. Thus, even though 
a subject ■ay have felt that hypotheses T and K were 
independent of one another,it would nevertheless still have 
been possible to have received information that 
simultaneously ■ade T more likely and Kless so. 
It is unlikely that this occurred however, not only because 
great care vas taken to avoid information with multiple 
implications, but also because of the generality of the 
effect. In each of the six possible situations a decrease in 
the rating of the alternative hypothesis was the most coamon 
response. An earlier analysis in this section also noted 
that there were no differences in rating patterns between 
stages. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that every piece 
of information at every stage was interpreted as being 
relevant to the alternative hypotheses and that this 
information vas consistently interpreted as making the 
alternatives less likely. 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
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II: Eli■ination of Alternatives 
The previous section de■onstrated that subjects tended to 
lover their ratings of alternative hypotheses. It would be 
of mora practical interest to discover whether these 
hypotheses were. in addition, deemed too unlikely to be 
worthy of further consideration. 
A hypothesis vas assumed to have been ruled out of 
consideration if the subject both indicated a lack of 
practical interest in it and gave it a rating of less than 
seventeen units. This vas meant to be a very broad 
definition that would be quite sure of including all 
subjects vho had lost interest in the hypothesis. Analysis 
vas conducted using only those subjects who had not ruled 
out any of the three hypotheses at the initial evaluation. A 
further restriction vas that the information made available 
vas shown to have had a confir■atory effect on the target 
hypothesis (i.e., caused a rating of at least sixty-two 
units or an increase of a least four units,. 
The results of the 4-vay analysis (Porm by Hypothesis 
confirmed by Stage by Number rated impossiblet appear in 
Table 13. Since only 24 subjects in this analysis had 
eli■inated both of their alternatives,these responses vere 
collapsed vith those vho had eliminated only one~ Treating 
the number of eliminated hypotheses as a response variable, 
the model: PHS,SN,HN was found to provide an adequate fit, 
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Tab l e 1 3 
Freq u encies of Number of Alternatives Rated Impo s sib l e by 
Booklet Form,Rating Stage and Hypothesis Confirmed 
a Stage Numbe r 
Hypothesis Form Imposs i ble 2 3 4 
Ca t egorical 0 29 17 43 
1 0 0 10 
A 
Quantitat i ve 0 28 21 58 
1 3 1 8 
Catego r ica l 0 16 63 26 
1 1 22 17 
B 
Quantitative 0 11 78 44 
1 5 18 19 
Catego r ica.l 0 43 6 13 
1 8 4 14 
C 
Quantitative 0 54 8 16 
1 5 4 11 
a 
Subject s with two alternatives rated impossible were in -
e l uded wi th those who had only eliminated one . 
Tab l e 14 
Estimated Odds in Favor of No Al terna t ives Rated Impossible 
by Ra t ing Stage and Hypothesis Confir.ned 
Stage 
Hypothesis 
A B C 
2 25.0 1 8 . 2 1 5 . 8 1 
3 10 . 4 1 3.4 1 2.4 1 
4 5 . 6 1 1.8 1 1. 3 1 
i 
: 
' 
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(Likelihood ratio 
Chi-square=17.40,p=.1818,chi-square=18.69,p=.1332,df=13). 
The results, aside from indicating that subjects vho 
selected the final A question vere less likely to eliainate 
alternatives, shoved that there vas a tendency to increase 
the proportion of eliminated hypotheses at the later stages. 
The estimated odds against the elimination of any hypotheses 
appear in Table 14. In spite of the just- mentioned result, 
the odds were always at least 1.3 to 1 against any 
hypotheses being eliminated. Even vith this very inclusive 
definition,there vas never any stage ,no matter which 
hypothesis vas confirmed, at which the majority of subjects 
eliminated even one of their hypotheses. 
rhe relationship between the number of hypotheses 
investigated and the number of alternatives eli■inated a~ 
the final stage was also examined. It vas expected that a 
subject who had only investigated one hypothesis (i.e., 
chose the question pertaining to the sa■e hypothesis at each 
stage), would be ■ore likely to eliminate alternatives when 
compared vith subjects who had investigated two hypotheses 
or those vho had had information on all three. All 
definitions and restrictions were as in the previous 
paragraph. 
Log-linear analysis of the data (Nuaber of hypotheses 
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investigated by Alternatives eliminated by Form, appears in 
Table 15. This analysis treated Alternatives eliminated as a 
response variable and added a constant of .s to each cell to 
get rid of the zero sub-aarginal at A=3, N=3. The model, NF, 
MA (likelihood ratio Chi•square=S.89,p=.1796, 
Chi-square=8.6.p=.1972,df=6) indicated that these variables 
were indeed significantly rela~ed , independent of fora 
type4 In general, the fever the number of hypotheses 
investigated, the ■ore likely it was for alternatiYes to be 
eliminated. In spite of this, 61.51 of subjects who 
investigated only one hypothesis still had not eli•inated 
any alternatives, and only 20S of this group had eliminated 
both. 
Thus, although subjects tended to lower the ratings of 
alternative hypotheses , it was unusual for any of these 
hypotheses to be deliberately abandoned , and more rare 
still for both alternatiYes to be eli■inated. 
Tab l e 15 
Frequencies of Al t ernative Hypotheses Rated 
I mpossib l e by Booklet Form and Number 
of Hypo t heses Explored 
Number Ex:elored 
Form Alternatives 1 2 3 
0 17 37 28 
Categorical 
1 5 18 9 
2 5 4 0 
0 23 60 35 
Quantitative 1 7 20 2 
2 8 1 0 
TOTAL 65 140 74 
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Total 
82 
32 
9 
118 
29 
9 
279 
page 70 
Opinion Variable: 
The next analysis examined subjects• agree ■ent with a 
statement Opinion implying that only the cause confirmed by 
the subject's final question selection was involved in 
causing the event described in the booklet scenario. This 
variable was inYestigated as a function of Form type, Number 
of hypotheses explored, and final Question selected. Three 
levels of the second explanatory variable were used, 
corresponding to whether the subject had, after ■aking all 
three question selections, chosen questions relating to one 
,two, or all three hfpotheses. The response variable was 
originally constructed vith five categories; "almost 
certainly true,""probably true," "unknown,""probably false" 
, and "alaost certainly false." There were, however, only 
thirteen responses in the last two categories ( 12 and 1 
responses respectively) and so, they were combined with the 
"unknown" responses whenever they appeared. 
The data appear in Table 16~ The fitted model FNQ, NO, QO 
had 26 degrees of freedom with a Likelihood ratio Chi-square 
of 27.16(p=.4008) and a Pearson Chi-square of 
23.68(p=.5943). These results ■ay be interpreted as stating 
that there were no form effects but that the number of 
hypotheses explored and final question selected (which 
deterained the content of the state■ent) each had an 
independent effect. 
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Table 16 
Frequencies of Opinion Variable Responses by Final Question 
Selected, Booklet Form, and Number of Hypotheses Explored 
(N=336) 
Number Explored 
Question Form Ooinion a 1 2 3 
Certain 5 4 4 
Categorical Probable 10 11 14 
Unknown 1 7 8 
A 
Certain 2 3 3 
Quantitative Probable 11 22 17 
Unknown 1 8 12 
Certain 11 18 2 
Categorical Probable 2 15 2 
Unknown 1 a 1 
B 
Certain 11 27 1 
Quantitative Probable 10 23 2 
Unknown 1 3 a 
Certain 2 4 0 
Categorical Probable 3 10 5 
Unknown 1 3 2 
C 
Certain 9 1 0 
Quantitative Probable 5 7 6 
Unknown 2 2 1 
a 
"Ifr1kn-ow.n" responses include "probably false" and "almost 
certainly false" responses. 
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The QO effect was due to the fact that the B hypothesis had 
more "almost certainly true" responses and fever unknown" 
responses relative ~o the A hypothesis. 
The lack of form effect, although in keeping vith previous 
findings, is especially noteworthy here in that the wording 
of the statements under the tvo conditions reflected not 
only a difference in the severity of the event described but 
also implied greater effects for the implicated cause. Thus, 
the categorical booklets contained stateaents in the form" 
If X had not occurred, the student would not have done 
poorly on the mid-term exam" where X vas the cause 
implicated by the final piece of information. The 
quantitative booklets on the other hand, used the form" If 
X had not occurred, the student would have done vell on the 
■id-ter■ exam." 
finding here is that the number of 
affected subjects• responses. 
The most important 
hypotheses explored 
Specifically, those 
significantly 
less likely 
compared with 
hypothesis. 
more 
vho explored all three hypotheses vere 
likely to have answered "unknown" and 
to have 
those 
answered 
vho only 
"almost certainly true" as 
investigated a single 
The category that included subjects vho had had exposure to 
confir■ation of two hypotheses produced no distinct results 
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on the Opinion response variable. On closer inspection of 
the original data, it vas found that the subjects first 
question selection had Yery little effect. Thus, with regard 
to affecting the response variable, there were only really 
two distinct groups, defined by whether the second and final 
question selections related to the same hypothesis. The 
groups which explored two hypotheses seemed to be a mixture 
of two type of subjects~ 
It should be noted however that, in spite of the effects of 
the scope of search, even those subjects who had 
investigated all three hypotheses only had 301 of their 
responses falling into the (collapsed) "unknown" category. 
In other words, 701 of this subgroup felt that other causes 
were almost certainly or probably not operating. 
In summary,most 
state■ent that 
subjects were 
implied that 
willing 
only a 
to agree 
single cause 
with a 
was 
operating. This tendency varied,to some extent,as a function 
of the number of hypotheses explored. Even so, all subjects 
bad at least a 70~ agreement rate regardless of prior search 
scope. 
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Recommend Variable: 
Subjects were asked whether they felt that the information 
that they baa collected allowed them a sufficient 
understanding of the event to confidently recommend 
corrective action or that additional information was deemed 
necessary. Subjects answered different sections of this 
question depending upon which of the above two situations 
they felt best described their feelings. Within each 
subsection, subjects were then asked to either list 
corrective action or indicate what additional information 
was required. 
These responses were classified as belonging to one of eight 
categories. Three categories were used to represent those 
responses that related to only o~e of the three hypothesized 
causes. An additional three categories were used to describe 
a reference to any one of three possible pairs of causes. 
The seventh category was reserved for subjects whose 
responses implicated all three causes. The eighth category 
was used for responses which were too general or a■biguous 
to be . clearly identified with one or ■ore of the 
hypothesized causes. 
The reliability of these classifications was checked by 
having an independent rater classify the responses of 75 
subjects which had been randomly selected fros the saaple. 
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Agree■ent vas found in 67 of the 75 cases (89.3 percent). 
Given the fact that chance agreement was only expected to be 
1 in 8, these results vere taken as evidence of substantial 
agree■ent Subsequent analyses were based on the vriter•s 
classifications alone. 
A total of 39 subjects (11.6 percent of the total sample) 
were excluded fro• analysis because of the ambiguity of 
their responses. With regard to the re■aining sample, 254 
subjects (85.2 percent) indicated that they felt that they 
fully understood why the event occurred. This group 
consisted of 187 (62.8 percent ) who recommended action 
relating to a single hypothesis, 48 (16~1 percent) whose 
recomaendations related to two hypotheses, and 19 (6.4 
percent ) whose reco■mendations implicated all three 
hypotheses. For the sake of further analyses, these latter 
tvo cat~~ories ver collapsed into a "•ultiple action" 
group. 
Of the 44 subjects (14.8 percent) vho felt that further 
infor■ation was required, 24 (8.1 percent ) wanted 
infor■ation relating to one hypothesis, 11 (3.7 percent) 
wanted information on two hypotheses, and 9 (3.0 percent t 
requested further details relating to all three hypotheses. 
These three categories were all collapsed into one "need 
information" group. 
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Three explanatory variables were included in the log-linear 
analysis; Number of hypotheses explored, Porm type, and 
Hypothesis confiraed as a result of final question 
selection. The wording of the response variable was the sa■ e 
for all subjects within form type. Those receiving th~ 
categorical booklet however, were asked to recommend 
corrective action if the information that they had selected 
had enabled them to fully understand why the student in the 
scenario "did poorly" on his ■id-tera exa■• The phrase in 
quotations vas ,in the quantitative booklet ,changed to 
"received the lowest grade in the class." 
The data. appear in Table 17. The fitted model HPH ,RH ,RR 
had 26 degrees of freedom and a Likelihood Ratio Chi-square 
of 28.10(p=.3537) and a Pearson Chi-square of 
25.47(p=.4927). Once again there were no effects of form 
type but final question selection and number of hypotheses 
explored did affect the response variable. 
subjects who had 
exploration of a 
confined their information search to 
single hypothesis were more likely to 
recommend intervention related to a single hypothesis and 
less likely to reco■aend multiple interventions when 
compared with subjects who had explored all three 
hypotheses. 
The effect of final question selection was somewhat complex. 
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Table 17 
Frequencies of Recommend Variable Responses by Final 
Hypothesis Confirmed, Booklet Form, and 
Number of Hypotheses Explored (N=298) · 
Number Ex:elored 
Hy:eothesis Form Recommend 1 2 
Categorical One Action 12 10 
Multiple Actions 0 4 
Need Information 1 5 
A 
Quantitative One Action 8 10 
Multiple Actions 0 6 
Need Information 4 5 
One Action 12 26 
Categorical Multiple Actions 0 3 
Need Information 1 3 
B 
Quantitat.ive One Action 21 38 
Multiple Actions 0 4 
Need Information 0 10 
One Action 4 8 
Categorical Multiple Actions 0 8 
Need Information 0 0 
C 
Quantitative One Action 13 4 
Multiple Actions 1 4 
Need In f ormation 1 1 
3 
10 
7 
5 
4 
18 
6 
2 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
5 
1 
3 
3 
1 
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The B question group had significantly more single cause 
action recommendations than did the A group. but 
significantly fever ■ultiple cause recommendations than did 
the C group. The A group h~d significantly more requests for 
additional information than did the c group. 
The effect of the first question selected seemed stronger in 
this analysis than in the Opinion variable results. For 
example, if T were the hypothesis confirmed by the final 
question selection. and A any other hypothesis, then a ATT 
group tended to request ~dditional information or make 
multiple action recommendations more often than a TTT group. 
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Relationships Among Variables: 
rhis final section is concerned with the relationship among 
variables which appear to measure aspects of the subjects• 
lack of interest in the possible involvement of additional 
causes. 
The first analysis considers four such variables. The first 
variable, crosscut, refers to the number of hypotheses rated 
below 17 units and marked as being too unlikely to be worthy 
of further consideration. Subjects vho had so rated any of 
their hypotheses at the initial evaluation were eli■inated 
from this analysis. Remaining subjects were dichotomized 
according to whether they had eliminated at least one 
hypothesis in this way. 
The second variable, Katch, ■easured whether the highest 
standardized usefulness rating given to additional 
information belonged to that hypothesis rated highest at the 
final evaluation . Subjects were re■oved from this analysis 
if their highest rated hypothesis vas either tied with any 
other or if it was not the same hypothesis confirmed by the 
final question selected~ This latter restriction vas 
necessary to coordinate these 
Opinion variable (discussed in 
reponses with those of the 
a later paragraph), the 
wording of which vas determined by the final question 
selected. 
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The !atch variable is very close to the measure of truncated 
search used by Shaklee & Pischhoff(1982). The major 
distinction between the two ■easures is that, in the Shaklee 
and Pischhoff study, the subjects being offered the 
additional information were explicitly told that one of the 
causes was "known" to be operating. With regard to the !atch 
variable,however, subjects were not excluded from this 
analysis if their highest rated hypothesis vas not rated 
certain. and thus these subjects may not be strictly said to 
have "known" of that hypothesis• involvement. · 
The justification for the inclusion of these subjects is 
twofold. Pirst, the final piece of information received vas 
actually proof of the definite involveaent of that cause, 
and 
that 
part 
it 
thus, in this sense, was equivalent to telling subjects 
it was a "known" cause4 Subjective certainty on the 
of the subject may be too strict a definition in that 
is likely that at least some of the subjects in the 
Shaklee and Pischhoff study were also uncertain, in spite of 
what they had been told. The comparative degree of certainty 
is not precisely known. on the one hand,subjects in the 
present study may have been more prone to uncertainty as a 
result of having been exposed to information that confirmed 
alternative hypotheses. on the other hand, it is possible 
that the feedback from a selected question may have been 
■ore convincing than simply being told to assume certainty. 
The issue of 
importance even 
found. Previous 
however be 
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of great certainty may not 
if differences between the samples were 
shown than "certain" analyses have 
hypotheses lead to very much the saae sort of search 
behavior as do those that are ranked highest, but not 
certain. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that tha 
validity of the Match variable would depend on the 
subjective certainty of the leading hypothesis. 
The third variable, Opinion, measures agreement with a 
statement which could only be true if there were no causes 
operating other than the one confirmed by the final question 
selected. Subjects• responses were dichotomized according to 
whether they expres~ed agreement with the statement ("almost 
certainly true" or "probably true"). 
The final 
willingness 
rationally 
variable, Recommend, measures subjects• 
to recommend intervention ,based on what should 
haYe been perceived as inadequate information. 
Three categories were used according to whether subjects had 
recomaended intervention directed towards a single cause 
,two or three causes, or felt that further information vas 
required. Subjects who recoam■ended action or requested 
information that could not be clearly related to at least 
one of the potential causes vere excluded from analysis. 
The crosstabulation appears in Table 18. The fitted model 
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Table 18 
Frequencies of Opinion Variable Responses by Recommend 
and Match Variables and Number of Alternatives 
Crossed Out at the Final Stage (N=222) 
Opinion 
Match Recommend Cross Out Agree Unknown 
None 39 3 
One Action Some 23 0 
No None 11 3 
Multiple Action Some 4 1 
None 10 2 
Need Informa ticn Some 1 0 
One Action None 59 2 
Some 27 2 
None 9 4 
Multiple Action Some 3 0 
Yes 
None 12 2 
Need Information Some 5 0 
page 83 
OR, C had 17 degrees of freedo• vith a Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-square of 18.SS(p=.3374) and a Pearson Chi-square of 
14.SO(p=.6312). In spite of the fact that each of these four 
measures varies as a function of the nu■ber of hypotheses 
explored, the model indicates that only the Opinion and 
Recoaaend variables are significantly associated with one 
another. Specifically, subjects who agreed vith the stated 
opinion vere ■ore likely to reco■■end intervention related 
to a single cause and less likely to recommend multiple 
interventions compared with those subjects who did not 
agree. There was no difference between the groups in the 
proportion of subjects who did not feel that they had enough 
information to recommend action. 
In this last analysis, the final rating was classified 
according to the number of hypotheses rated certain( i.e., 
marked as being beyond practical doubt and at least 48 
units) in order to examine its relationship to the Opinion 
and Recommend variables (as previously defined). 
As in the previous analysis, data vere eliminated if the 
Recomsend response was not clearly related to one or more of 
the hypothesized causes or if the highest rated hypothesis 
at the final stage was not that confirmed by feedback from 
the third question selected. In addition, subjects were 
eliminated from analysis if one or more of the hypotheses 
rated certain, vere also rated certain initially(i.e before 
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any information vas seen). 
The results which appear in Table 19, are fit by the model 
RO,RC, (likelihood ratio Chi-square=3.09,p=.7980, Pearson 
Chi-square=2.99, p=.8099,df=6). The RO interaction indicates 
,as in the previous ~nalysis, the association between 
agree■ent with the stated opinion and the recommendation of 
a single intervention, and between an "unknown" response and 
the recommendation of multiple corrective actions. The RC 
interaction is due to the tendency for those who have a 
single certain hypothesis to recommend a single action, 
whereas those with ■ore than one hypothesis rated certain 
tended to recom■end multiple corrective actions. 
The lack of association between the number of hypotheses 
rated certain and the Opinion variable is somewhat 
sarprising. The RO interaction suggests, at least among 
those fev subjects in this analysis that gave an "unknown" 
response, that their lack of agreemen~ was due to concern 
for the involvement of alternatives. Then, those with 
multiple certain hypotheses would be expected to produce a 
auch lover proportion of agreement responses. 
The reason this did not occur is that a majority of subjects 
with aultiple certain responses followed an unusual pattern 
of exploring all three hypotheses but only rating the first 
two explored as being certain. Thus, these subjects wer~ 
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Table 19 
Frequencies of Recommend Variable . Responses by 
Opinion Variable Responses and Number of 
Hypotheses . Rated Certain at the 
Final Stage (N=221) 
Recommend 
One Multiple Need a 
Certain Opinion Action Actions Information 
None Agree . 26 9 8 
Unknown 2 2 1 
Agree 116 14 20 
One Unknown 4 8 2 
Agree 1 6 1 
Two Unknown 0 1 0 
a 
The "Two" category includes responses of subjects who rated 
all three hypotheses . certain 
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largely excluded from this analysis. An examination of the 
excluded subjects vith multiple certain hypotheses shoved 
that only 8 of the 15 had given an agreement response to the 
Opinion variable4 
One possibility then, (discussed further in a later sectiont 
is that it required both an uncertainty about the discussed 
cause as well as certainty about the involvement of both 
alternatives to produce a reasonable probability that a 
subject vould not agree vith the stated opinion. 
Results then, have shovn that subjects tended to display 
both serial and truncated search. Ratings of alternative 
hypotheses decreased at each stage,but 
vere,nevertheless,seldom ruled out of consideration. In 
spite of this ,most subjects were willing to agree with a 
statement that implied that only a single cause vas 
operating. In addition, most subjects indicated that they 
had encountered enough information to fully understand vhy 
the event occurred, and then vent on to suggest that 
intervention relating to a single cause would be sufficient 
to insure that the event did not reoccur. The responses to 
the Reco■mend variable shoved some relationship to the 
Opinion responses and to the number of hypotheses deemed 
certain. All variables were related to the scope of the 
subject•s search, but the size of this relationship was 
fairly small in all cases4 
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Discussion 
Serial Search: 
The results of this study confirm the "serial" nature of 
search. defined by Shaklee and Fischhoff as the initial 
clarification of one cause before consideration of any 
others. In that study. it was found that subjects tended to 
choose to investigate that hypothesis initially made to 
appear most plausible. The implication is that. since the 
results of such an investigation• in the case of a multiply 
caused event. will likely yield information compatible vith 
the hypothesis in question. that hypothesis should continue, 
at subsequent stages. to be seen as being more plausible 
than any of the other alternatives. As such. it should 
continue . to be ir 1estigated. producing a series of 
questions. all relating to the same hypothesis. 
This study vas able to demonstrate both ~his relationship 
between the relative rank of a hypothesis and question 
selection, and the similarity of sequential questions. With 
regard to the first relationship,subjects were most likelr 
to investigate a hypothesis if it vas rated more highly than 
any of the others. and there vas also a tendency, after the 
completion of question selection. to rate additional 
information relating to such a hypothesis as being most 
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useful. 
·There vas also evidence that this process tended to aaintain 
the relative superiority of the investigated hypothesis, 
both by increasing its own rating, and by leading to a 
decrease in the ratings of alternatives. Stability of 
ranking, being dependent upon receiving compatible feedback, 
would thas not necessarily be present in the case where 
events had a single cause,since there voald then be less 
chance of randomly selecting a correct hypothesis. As such, 
investigations would not n~cessarily have a serial charac~er 
, unless some sort of bias in the interpretation of results 
was also .acting. 
The fact 
study is 
that 
both 
an 
serial search tendencies were found in this 
a replication of the Shaklee and Pischhoff 
extension of these results to a trae finding, and 
sequence of 
serial search 
investigations. 
showed only 
The original demons t ration of 
that subjects preferred a 
hypothesis related question, or a set of such questions at a 
single selection. Strictly speaking, a search could not be 
said to be serial unless as in the present study t his 
tendency persisted through feedback and subsequent selection 
stages. 
Evidence presented here shoved that the question selected at 
the first stage vas relat~d to the second question selected 
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and it. in turn. was related to the final selection. It 
might however. still be argued that if the similarity 
between successive questions decreased over time. 
relatedness might eventually disappear over a long sequence 
of investigations. It was not possible to directly test the 
validity of this idea by examining the stationarity of the 
inter-stage transition matrix because of the changing 
relative attractiveness of questions at each stage. It was 
possible.however. to examine the stability of the underlying 
rank by selection interaction. and this relationship vas 
found to be equal at all stages. at least with regard to the 
B and c hypotheses• data. The A da~a•s second order 
interaction was found to derive fro■ a weaker effect (lover 
relative effect of being ranked highest) at the first stage. 
These particular results then. seem to argue for a 
strengthening of ~he relationship at the later stages. Thus. 
for the sample as a whole. the tendency to choose. at a 
given selection. the question related to the highest ranking 
hypothesis • remained at least as strong at the later 
stages. 
If looked at as a within subjects measure however. there is 
some suggestion that the tendency to limit search to a 
single hypothesis. may in some cases. increase with each 
selection. Por example. it was shown that not only was the 
selection of a gnestion at the third stage most likely for 
those vho had also selected it at the second stage. but it 
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was more likely still for those who had ,in addition, 
selected 
dependent 
it at the first stage. Thus search tendencies were 
upon more than just the im■ediate past selection. 
Similarly, it was shown that subjects whose second and third 
selections related to the saae hypothesis, were more likely 
to rate the (standardized) usefulness of further inforaation 
as being highest for that hypothesis, as compared with those 
vho had chosen to investigate that hypothesis at the third 
stage only. It would appear then, that the more subjects 
chose to investigate 
likely they were to 
future. 
a particular hypothesis, the more 
continue to investigate it in the 
As a final point, it should be noted that the rank-question 
selection relationship can be seen as a result of subjects 
following a confiraatory search strategy. Viewed in this 
way, the most highly rated hypothesis is the one under most 
active consideration (perhaps the only one), and the 
questions selected are those which promise to provide 
evidence supporting this hypothesis. A subject wishing to 
clarify the situation by use of disconfir■ing strategies 
would instead have been expected to haYe selected questions 
relating to the lover ranked hypotheses. If the answers 
received from those questions were not compatible, it would 
have allowed an opportunity to eliminate the weaker 
explanations to which they related. Alternatively, if the 
results were confirmatory, this ■ight have been seen as a 
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challenge to the major hypothesis. at least among those 
subjects vho were unwilling to consider the possibility of 
several simultaneously operating causes. 
Thus. results indicate that confirmatory search patterns 
vere employed and that this led to a tendency to investigate 
the sa■e hypothesis at consecutive question selctions. 
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Truncated Search: 
The significance of serial search rests upon the 
demonstration of "truncation", defined as the termination of 
search after the role of one cause has been saitable 
clarified. Thus, a subject displaying a serial,truncated 
search, would tend to investigate only one cause and then 
stop the investigation, leaving other potential causes 
unexplored. 
Truncation,in this study operationalized as the persistence 
of the rank-selection relationship after the involvement of 
a hypothesis was judged to be certain, was indeed found to 
occur. This was determined both by analyzing the pattern of 
questions selected by those who became certain before seeing 
all three pieces of information, as well as by exaaining 
the rated usefuln~ss of addi ' ional infor■ation for those who 
vere certain after receiving feedback fro■ all of their 
questions. In each analysis, subjects who were certain of a 
hypothesis• involvement seemed as interested in further 
inforaation about it as d~d those who had rated that 
hypothesis highest but not certain. Since certainty will 
most likely result from inforaation received from the 
preceeding investigation, this finding is equivalent to 
saying that certainty does not interrupt the tendency to 
search in a serial manner. 
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Defining truncation as the continuation of serial search 
requires some coa■ent. A more intuitive definition might 
involve a ■easurement of the subject's inclination to 
terminate all further search, but all such measures would be 
liable to overestimate disinterest in alternatives by 
including responses which reflect a ■ore general apathy 
about the task as a whole. The definition used here, and in 
the Shaklee and Fischhoff study, is a much more strict 
criterion in that it assumes that subjects, who might under 
natural circu■stances have stopped investigating, 
vould,nevertheless,still avoid exploring alternatives if 
forced to continue their collection of information. 
This amounts to saying that subjects, in general, prefer to 
exa■ine redundant or unnecessary inforaation rather than 
widening the scope of their search. The validity of this 
measure then, rests upon the assu■ption that the information 
chosen. was in fact,not needed. Shaklee and Pischhoff simply 
told their subjects that one of the hypotheses was "known" 
to be involved, but it is not clear whether such a 
manipulation alone vould have been enough to re■ove all 
doubt about its role. The present study, in relying upon the 
subjects• own ratings was less likely to overestimate 
subjective certainty. 
Tvo other controls were adaed to this study. First ,subjects 
were asked to estimated the effect that the certain 
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involvement of one hypothesis vould have had on others. The 
fact that only a minority of subjects saw certainty of one 
hypothesis 
risk that 
as making alternatives less likely. reduces the 
the specific hypotheses used in this study were 
perceived as being mutully exclusive or negatively related. 
In other words, subjects did not fail to investigate 
alternatives because they were seen as being incompatible 
with the hypothesis deemed certain. 
If hypotheses were seen as being perfectly independent of 
one another. the probability of an alternative hypothesis 
operating. given the certain involvement of some other 
hypothesis. wold simply be the baseline probability of tha~ 
alternative. Another possibility then, is that subjects 
ignored alternatives because their baseline probabilities 
were considered to be too low to be worthy of serious 
consideration. Data from the final evaluation howevgr. 
renders such an explanation untenable. Almost all subjects 
had at least one alternative that had not been ruled out of 
consideration at the final stage. and a large aajori~y had 
indicated that both alternatives were still being 
considered. It is not possible to judge whether these final 
ratings tended to be below their perceived baseling · 
probabilities. since no unconditional estimates were taken. 
It is clear however.that these alternatives were, for the 
most part. still considered to be reasonably likely. 
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Scope of Search: 
The basic assumptions of the Shaklee and Fischhoff article 
are that a truncated search vill leave the investigator with 
an incomplete account of a multiply caused event, and that 
it is this limited exposure to information that will lead to 
difficulties in dealing vith this event. 
Both of these assumptions are however open to question. With 
regard to the first point, it is important to note that, 
although subjects display a tendency to limit their search 
to an investigation of a single hypothesis,this is not the 
same thing as assu■ing that only one type of confirmatory 
information will be encountered. It is clear that the extent 
to which investigators would be drawn to explore other 
hypotheses should ,at a miniaum,vary as a function of the 
number of alternatives, their relative plausibility,and the 
accessibility and richness of information about them. In the 
case of this study,although subjects always had a higher 
probability of choosing a particular question if they had 
previously chosen it,that probability vas nevertheless, 
often quite lov. Moreover, after attempting to control for 
question differences, it vas found that only 57.6i of 
subjects with one certain hypothesis indicated that further 
information · about that hypothesis would be more useful than 
infor■ation related to either of the two non-certain 
alternatiYes~ At that rate, only 19.1~ of subjects would 
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have been expected to have chosen all three questions 
relating to the same hypothesis, assuming that all 
alternatives had been eqaated for perceived attractiveness. 
It is difficult to estiaate how search would actually 
proceed 
unlikely 
under naturalistic conditions where questions are 
to be equated and where selections are made from a 
total set of questions containing an unequal number relating 
to each hypothesis. It is possible that ,since all sources 
simultaneously vie for attention ,rather than, as in this 
study, being limited to nonoverlapping choice subsets,there 
■ay be an increased chance that several types of information 
will be seen. 
Still, there are several reasons to believe that 
naturalistic 
deaonstrated 
case that 
search may be somewhat more narrow than 
in this study. For example, it is often the 
one hypothesis is,in fact, on the whole, much 
easier to investigate than others. In addition,most casual 
investigations may not delineate alternatives as explicitly 
as those in this study, nor is it certain that investigators 
would be able to formulate questions to test these 
alternatives as readily as they might devise vays to examine 
the leading hypothesis. 
The scope of a search then is likely to Tary from one 
situation to another. To the extent that the search is a 
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casual and brief investigation where confirming information 
relating to the major hypothesis is easily available, it is 
very probable that alternatives would not be explored. 
However, 
where a 
explicitly 
in the case of a more consequential investigation 
number of reasonably plausible alternatives were 
acknowledged, it see■s much aore likely that a 
variety of information voald come to light in the course of 
the investigation. 
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Effects of Scope of Search: 
The previous section suggested that the tendency to engage 
in a truncated search. is only one of many factors vhich 
deter■ine the scope of search. The scope in turn. been shown 
to affect a number of measures vhich reflect the subjects• 
tendency to ignore alternative hypotheses. The connection 
between truncation and the ignoring of alternatives is thus 
indirect. This is a likely explanation for the finding that 
the "match" variable. a measure of truncation independent of 
actual feedback. was unrelated to either the "crosscut"• 
"opinion" or "recoa■end" variables. 
The purpose of this section however. is to argue that even 
the more direct scope of search variable .plays only a 
limited role in determining how subjects treat alternatives. 
Those subjects who limited their search to an investigation 
of only one hypothesis. tended to rule out of consideration 
more alternatives at the final evaluation than did those vho 
had investigated tvo or three hypotheses. The foraer group 
was also relatively ■ore likely to strongly agree with the 
statement in the "opinion" variable. and to feel confident 
that a single action would guarantee that the student. 
described in the scenario, would not fail his final exam. 
In spite of these findings.the same general pattern of 
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responses were found for all groups, regardless of the scope 
of their search. It vas found that even among those who had 
seen only one kind of information, 61.51 of subjects still 
had not ruled out any of their hypotheses at the final 
stage, and only 201 had eliminated both. Although these 
figures do indicate a relative disinterest in alternatives, 
it must still be acknowledged that the actual proportion of 
subjects expressing no further interest, even by this very 
liberal definition, is guite small. A tendency was noted for 
the nuaber of ruled out hypotheses to increase at each 
stage,presumably as a result of the increasing confirmation 
of the investigated hypothesis~ Since the final confiraation 
vas probably as strong as one could normally expect to 
encounter, it is unlikely that the proportion of eliminated 
alternatives would rise much beyond those levels seen at the 
final evaluation. 
It was also found that the group that had investigated a 
single hypothesis tended to have a somewhat greater 
proportion of subjects vho strongly agreed with the stated 
conclusion, and fever that were unsure or disagreed. In 
spite of this, agreement vas still the norm for all groups. 
Among those vho had seen all three types of information, 
"probably true" was the ■odal response,leaving only a 
minority of subjects unsure or in disagreement. 
With regard to the "recoamend"Yariable, the vast aajority of 
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subjects in all groups seemed to feel that they had a 
complete understanding of all causal forces and were thus in 
a position to recomaend corrective action. A greater scope 
of search did not,even in a relative sense, diminish this 
overall confidence, but rather seemed to encourage the 
reco11maendation of aultiple,as opposed to single, 
interventions. since the majority of such multiplg 
reco■mmendations made reference to only tvo causes, this 
typically a■ounted to ignoring one potential cause. 
It should also be noted that, given the nature of the 
information made available,subjects often seemed willing to 
recommend corrective action relating to a cause which vas 
not decisively implicated. 
In sum■ary then ,encountering information suggestive of the 
existance of more than one cause did have some effect on 
behavior. In spite of this, the average subject, although 
hesitant to directly rule out hypotheses ,vas willing to act 
as though such alternatives vere of no consequence. This was 
demonstrated not only by their agreement ~ith a stated 
conclusion, but also in regard to their own decisions about 
corrective actions. 
The possiblilility exists that the apparent robustness of 
these findings, in the face of varying degrees of diverse 
information, is simply an artifact of the manner in which 
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the information ■ade available increased in confiraatory 
strength at each stage. Xhus it could be argued that prior 
information was si■ply overwhelmed by the more compelling 
evidence encountered at later stages .. 
To the extent that investigators would. under natural 
conditions. simply stop their information search after 
becoming certain of a cause. and to the extent that tha~ 
certainty would result froa a particularly strong piece of 
confirmatory evidence, it is like~y that the final 
infor■ation considered vould be. as in this study, the ■ost 
persuasive .. 
~ore importantly, although the strength of confiraations 
increased at each stage, the earier pieces of 
information.(especially those that the second stage) were 
far from trivial. Xhere is evidence that these earier 
confirmations, in some cases. actually overwhelmed later 
information .. It was earlier reported that those subjects who 
had investigated a wider range of hypotheses were less 
likely to have rated any of their hypotheses as being 
certain ,(judged by very inclusive criteria). Xhe final 
piece of evidence vas however vorded in such a vay as to 
remove all practical doubt as to the involvement of that 
hypothesis. Thus, it can only be assumed that those subjects 
vho did not rate the ~ypothesis considered last to be 
certain, were not fully processing that information, and 
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that receiving prior information relating to other 
hypotheses, increased the likelihood that this would occur. 
Another point should be made about the scope of search 
variable, and that is that it measures not only the type of 
information seen, but also all those factors acting on 
individuals which predispose them to adopt their particular 
pattern of search. Thus, it can not be assumed that the type 
of person who chose to exclusively investigate only one 
hypothesis, would have reacted in the same way to other 
information, as did those who actively sought it out. 
This does not necessarily weaken the validity of this 
measure since it is likely that, under natural conditions, 
information will be available only to those who actively 
pursue 
would 
it. Even if this were not the case however,there 
still be little reason to expect that those subjects 
now receiving the inforaation ,would be more affected by it 
than those who sought it independently. on the contrary, it 
is more likely that those those vho actively chose to 
investigate a particular hypothesis would be more willing to 
accept their findings. Thus, the limited effects of scope of 
search might have been even less substantial if information 
had been passively received. 
In 
only 
conclusion then, the scope of search seemed to have had 
ainor effects on Opinion and Recommend variable 
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responses. It would appear that encountered 
information.influenced indirectly by some single-cause or 
sufficiency heuristic (discussed farther in later 
sections) .is then evaluated by this heuristic. Apparently 
the decisions produced by this heuristic were only slightly 
dependent upon the scope of the considered information. 
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Opinion Variable: 
Subjects ratings seemed to indicate that eYen those vho had 
investigated only a single hypothesis,nevertheless still 
kept open the possibility that alternatives were operating. 
This apparent 
carry over to 
variables. 
concern for alternatives did not ,however, 
the more applied Opinion and Recom■end 
The Opinion Yariable can be likened either to a casually 
offered assessment of a situation, having no particular 
implications, or instead as a defini~e proposal raised for 
discussion. Viewed fro■ the latter perspective, it is 
possible to imagine a diagnostic committee in which some 
member gives his opinion as to vhat is causing the event in 
question in just such a manner. If general agreement could 
be obtained, i~ is reasc iable to assume that discussion 
■ight then end, and an official recom■endation (i.e. on 
behalf of the committee) be made, based on an assumption of 
a single cause. 
In so far as this variable does mirror behavior in such a 
situation, 
reached. 
it is very likely that group consensus would be 
Results here indicated that even subjects with 
exposure to a vide range of confirmatory eYidence (including 
those who objectively rate multiple causes as being 
certainly inYolved) were still likely to respond with some 
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degree of agreement, a response vhich implied the absence of 
additional causes. In addition, although the B hypothesis 
(perceived initially as being the most plausible led to a 
greater proportion of sabjects who strongly agreed with the 
statement,general agreement vas still the norm regardless of 
the hypothesis explored at the final stage. 
The only sitaation in which this is not the rule occurs when 
subjects are both less than certain about the putative 
single cause and, in addition, ar9 very confident about the 
involvement of two alternative causes. When this situation 
does not occur, only a s■all minority of subjects wi thhold 
agreement, presu~ably out of a relatively rare concern for 
the involvement of other causes. A wide scope of search 
although limited in its effect, is nevertheless associated 
with an increase in both types of subjects. 
If all three possible causes are denoted I, Y and z, then a 
statement in the form" If not x, then no effect" i■plies 
both " I is a cause" and " Y and z are not". one 
possiblility 
about both 
then, is t~at subjects needed to have doubts 
assertions in order to be reasonable likely to 
This conclusion is open to question however, in 
rating responses of the group which met these 
were most atypical and this ■ay also be true of 
disagree. 
that the 
criteria 
their judge■ent processes. In addition, the wide scope of 
search associated with this group may, with respect to the 
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Opinion variable, be less causal, and more a response itself 
to some set of initial assu■ptions. 
Because the form of the Opinion variable was determined by 
the final question selected, most subjects felt at least 
that this particular hypothesis was more likely than not, 
and so probably tended to agree with the" Xis a cause" 
implication. Another possiblility then, is that the belief 
in the involve■ent of I , in some vay, overrides doubts 
about the non-involveaent off and z. Thus, it may be the 
case that, that when subjects both agree and disagree in 
part, that the agreement judgements get more heavily 
weighted. This type of process is similar to that reported 
by Gollob, Boss, and Abelson (1973) who found that 
confirming instances generally have more impact on inductive 
conclusions than do disconfirming instances. In this 
respect,the stated opinion is analogous to a hypothesis, and 
the subject's belief in the involve■ent of Xis a piece of 
confirmatory data which is given more weight than the 
incompatible (disconfirming) beliefs about the involvement 
of Y and z. 
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Recommend Variable: 
This variable required the subject to first judge the 
adequacy of the information that they had encountered, and 
then decide either on appropriate action or specify further 
information needed. 
Rationally ~peaking, the very best one could have done was 
to encounter information which definitely i ■plicated once 
cause and gave less conclusive support to the tvo others. 
Therefore, an appropriate response should have been to 
indicate that there vas not enough information on which to 
base action. This however, was a most unusual response. ~ost 
subjects instead indicatea that they had enough information 
to completely understand why the event occurred. If this 
pattern of confidence had been observed only in that group 
of subjects vho had eEplored all three hypotheses, it may 
have been possible to interpret this result as indicating a 
llv threshold of practical certainty;that subjects were 
simply willing to act on less than definitive evidence. As 
will be discussed later, this aay well be true, but it is 
not adequate to explain why the proportion of similarly 
confident subjects is as least as high within the groups 
that had explored only one or two hypotheses. Nor does a low 
threshold theory account for the fact that the vast majority 
of reco■■endations were for less than three actions. This 
issue is discussed further in a later section. 
page 108 
Given the decision to proceed with recommendations, a wider 
scope of search did, as mentioned in a previous section, 
increase the probability that multiple actions would be 
aavocated. Within the group that had explored tvo hypotheses 
however, 86.2~ of such recommendations made reference to 
only tvo actions, and even within the group that had 
explored all three hypotheses 59.4i of multiple actions were 
limited to implicating two causes. Thus, these 
reco■mendations must still be judged inadequate by a simple 
rational standard. Similarly,although investigation of the 
strongest hypothesis (B) led to more single action 
recommendations , even the weakest hypothesis (A) led to 
very fev requests for further information. 
Returning nov 
appear that 
to the 
subjects 
low threshold possibility, it would 
often shoved a willingness to act on 
hypotheses not rated as being certain. Por exaaple, among 
subjects who had not rated any of their hypotheses as being 
certain, 58$ nevertheless felt confident enough to recommend 
a single action, and a further 231 recommended multiple 
actions. It should be noted that this latter figure is 
higher than that for subjects with a single certain 
hypothesis (only 131 of whom recommended multiple actions). 
This can be explained by the fact tha~ a relatively large 
proportion of subjects with no certain responses 
,nevertheless had rated more than one hypothesis as being 
likely (i.e above 32 units). This ■ay be taken as additional 
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evidence that the threshola for inclusion in action is often 
less than the absence of all practical doubt. 
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Single Cause Heuristic: 
Many of the results of this study are consistent vith the 
idea that subjects started their investigations with an 
i■plicit assuaption that the event must have had only a 
single cause. Under such a "single-cause" heuristic,the 
decrease in the ratings of alternatives and the larger 
number of such alternatives ruled out of consideration at 
later stages, could be seen as the reciprocal relationship 
expected for ratings of mutually exclusive events. In 
addition, if there is only one possible cause, there would 
be no need to continue search after one seemed certain 
(truncated search). The relative absence of more than one 
hypothesis rated certain, the general agreement vith the 
Opinion variable, and the confidence of complete 
understanding displayed on the Recommend variable are also 
coapatible vith this assumption. It would also explain vhy a 
vide scope of search increased the proportion of subjects 
vho did not rate any of their hypoth~ses as certain. Prom 
this point of view, a series of data confirming different 
hypotheses should have been expected to produce confusion 
about which one of the causes was "really" involved. 
fhe ■ost convincing justification for the operation of a 
"single-cause" heuristic comes indirectly from the work of 
Kelley (1972). Kelley argued that observers employed a 
"multiple sofficient scheme" vhen it was believed that any 
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one of several causes alone could have produced an effect. 
Thus, in the case of two potential causes X and Y, the 
presence of either one was assumed to account for th9 
effect. The implication of this was, since the causes were 
not ■utually exclusive, that if the effect occurred and X 
was known to have been present, there should be ambiguity 
about the role of Y since, in this situation, either its 
presence or absence was compatible with the presence of the 
effect. 
A number of studies however, found that subjects often 
considered the presence of Y given X to be not merely 
ambiguous or uncertain, but distinctly unlikely (Kun,1977; 
Kun and Weiner,1973; Shultz, Butkovsky, Pearce, and 
Shanfield, 1975; Smith,1975)~ Uncertainty about the presence 
of a second cause was however reported by Shultz and 
Butkowsky (1977). That study found that approximately 50% of 
subjects judged a second cause to be present, and SO~ judged 
it to be absent given prior knowledge of the presence of 
another sufficient cause. 
If X and Y are independent, then the probability of Y given 
X should be equal to the baseline or unconditional 
probability of Y. Kelley's "multiple sufficient scheme" 
seemed to amount to nothing more than that, and therefore 
the degree of uncertainty experienced should be determined 
by the baseline probability of Y. In spite of this, none of 
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the above mentioned studies controlled for this probability. 
One study which did however, vas Kun and ~urray (1980). 
Those authors found that the conditional probability of I 
given X was ,on average, below the baseline probability of 
t. To explain this finding, Kun and Murray referred to 
Kelley's discussion of "graded effects" in which he noted 
that "if the attributor distinguishes degrees of a given 
effect, he is likely to assuae that it increases with the 
cumulative strength of relevant causes" (p.158). On the 
basis of this, Kun and Murray argued that subjects are 
sensitive to quantitative or qualitative variations in the 
effect under consideration, and that they make an initial 
estimation as to whether one or more causes are li~ely to be 
operating. This was termed the "variant effect scheme". 
Kun and Weiner(1973) had previously found support for 
Kelley's assertion that a ■altiple sufficient scheme vas 
employed to account for common events, but unusual or 
extreme events were likely to elicit a "multiple necessary 
scheme"(i.e. an assumption that both X and Y would be needed 
to cause the effect). Presumably then, in extreme even~s, 
the subject judges that he is observing more than one cause 
"worth" of effect, and therefore implicates both x and Y. 
Conversely,in most co■mon events,subjects judge that they 
are observing only a single cause "worth" of effect and ,as 
such, he can be quite sure that Y is not operating ,given 
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the presence of x. 
In this study,the median rating of alternative hypotheses at 
the final evaluation was 17 units in the group which had 
explored only one hypothesis. This figure, is halfway 
between "iapossible" and "neutral" and can be taken to mean 
than subjects were somewhat sure that alternatives were not 
involved. A strict interpretation of the variant effect 
scheme however, should have implied that subjects would be 
more than somewhat sure of non-involve■ent (even though none 
of the studies cited above reported certainty of 
non-involvement). Perhaps this can be explained in terms of 
the difficulties in precisely determing the number of causes 
operating. Also, there may be some hesitancy on the part of 
subjects to rate causes as being either absolutely certain 
or impossible. In addition. the nature of this study, which 
called for ■ultiple reassess■ents of the same cause makes 
the operation of "anchoring" effects quite likely (Tversky 
and Kahneman,1974). Since the initial evaluation of an 
alternative starts off high. it is possible that the final 
rating is biased in an upward direction. 
Similarly, the rated independence of causes noted earlier is 
not incompatible with a variant effect sche■e in that it 
requires, not that events be mutually exclusiYe, but only 
that they be treated as sach, given the judgement that only 
one effect "worth" of effect has been observed. 
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Other objections to this interpretation, however, are less 
easily dis■issed~ First, few hypotheses were eliminated at 
the final evaluation. The measure used did not call for a 
belief in the strict iapossibility of the hypothesis, but 
only that , in a practical sense, the hypothesis was no 
longer worthy of further consideration. It is true that this 
reluctance to dismiss alternatives was not always reflected 
in other ■easures, but the literature cited in support of 
the variant effect scheme has usually relied on similar 
sorts of ratings as the major dependent variable. 
Second,although 
ratings would 
nevertheless it 
it might be unreasonable to expect that 
sum precisely to 64 units at each stage, 
should follow that no more than one of the 
three (presu■able exhaustive and mutually exclusive) causes 
could simultaneously be rated above "neutral", assuming ~hat 
such a rating was taken to mean that there was a .s 
probability of involvement4 In fact, when all three 
hypotheses were explored, 36.31 of subjects rated two of 
their hypotheses over 32 units, and 48.81 rated all three 
hypotheses as such. 
Siailarly, it is difficult to explain why a wide scope of 
search should often have resulted in the recommendation of 
aaltiple actions if only one was assumed to be operating. 
Perhaps the strongest objection to the variant effect scheme 
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is the absence of "fora" effects found in this study. !f 
subjects discriminate among effect sizes. then they ought to 
have reacted to the categorical effect as a coa■on event 
requiring only a single cause explanation. The quantitative 
effect however. should have been seen as an unusual event. 
and thereby evoked a multiple necessary scheme. It is 
conceivable that the absence of differences between the two 
forms was due to the fact that subjects included in their 
understanding of "did poorly" that case where the student 
received the "lowest grade in the class". But. since the 
opposite merging is not logically consistent. (i.e. "the 
lowest grade in the class" can not logically accomodate all 
instances of "did poorly") it should have followed that both 
forms would have evoked aultiple necessary schemes. 
One possible explanation coaes from Kun and Weiner(1973) vho 
found that subjects were somewhat ■ore likely to attribute a 
failure to the action of a single cause. even in the case of 
an unusual or extreme failure. Even so.in that study the 
ratings of alternatives in the extre■e failure scenario were 
higher than those in the common failure scenario. ~oreover. 
since the subjects for this study were drawn from an 
introductory psychology coarse consisting of approxi■ately 
500 students, it seems hard to believe that they could have 
looked upon receiving the "lowest grade in the class" as 
being anything but an extreme failure. 
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Sufficiency Heuristic: 
Another way of accounting for the results of this study 
would be to assume ,not that subjects necessarily expected a 
single cause solution, but rather that they were willing to 
accept an incomplete solution as sufficient. Any sufficiency 
heuristic consistant with obtained results would have to 
consist of at least two sub-strategies. It would have to 
seek to account for both the event and other information 
encountered in the exploration of that event, and it would 
have to try to do so as parsimoniously as possible. 
The first point implies that in general, no attempt would be 
made to account 
the implications 
for information not encountered,nor would 
of such information be considered (i.e., 
"out of sight,out of ■ind")4 such a strategy would explain a 
preference for aarrow seat :h since, initially,although any 
hypothesis would be sufficient to account for the 
event,later only the investigation of the previously 
explored hypothesis could also pro■ise to account for the 
just encountered information. Thus, a subject who explored 
only a single cause would still be in a position to 
sufficiently explain ,not only the event, but also the three 
pieces of information encountered. 
Similarly~ it 
proportion of 
would explain the actions of the large 
subjects who indicated that they completely 
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anderstood why the event occurred. Viewed from this 
perspectiYe, such an assertion would mean only that th~ 
subject felt completely confident that he could account for 
the information he had seen. 
The relative lack of hypotheses ruled out of consideration 
is also expected since it requires only that subjects not be 
willing to make judgements in the absence of encountered 
information. In other words, an actual decision that a 
particular cause was not involved would have necessitated 
the encountering of information incompatible vith the 
existence of that cause. On the other hand,even though not 
explicitly ruled . out of consideration, a cause might well 
still be ignored because a sufficient explanation was 
possible without it. 
The question of why the ratings of non-confirmed hypotheses 
tended to decrease ,is not directly addressed by the 
operation of a sufficiency heuristic. Presuaably, and in 
contrast to the findings of Kun and Kurray(1980), this 
decrease represents a return to baseline estimates for that 
hypothesis. If a particular hypothesis had ,in the past, 
been the object of confirmatory information,its 
unconditional probability estimate would be expected to 
increase. Even so, this higher figure may still have been 
less than the estiaate of involvement when none of the three 
causes had yet been rendered certain. This relationship 
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would be particularly likely if atte•pts were made to 
dismiss prior confirmatory evidence, a strategy discussed 
further later in this section. In other words, it is likely 
that the baseline probability of an alternative, even ona 
which had received some measure of prior confirmation, was 
lover than the probability of its involve■ent initially. 
The exclusive concern with encountered information has also 
been found in work on judge■ent of covariation among events 
(e.g. Jenkins and Ward,1965; Smedslund,1963; Ward and 
Jenkins,1965). In these studies, subjects were presented 
with a series of 2 X 2 contingency tables, which described 
each of the two variables as being either present or absent. 
A co■mon failing was the almost exclusive reliance upon the 
size of the "present-present" cell relative to the entire 
saaple , in determining covariation, thus ignoring the 
implications of events that did not occur. This is also 
similar to the finding in the concept utilization studies 
that people prefer to use positive instances of concepts 
over negative ones (e.g. Hovland and Weiss,1953). 
It is also possible that this strategy accounts for one 
early demonstration of the "representative" heuristic termed 
the "law of s■all numbers" (Tversky and Kahneman,1971). This 
phrase referred to the inordinate confidence that 
researchers often had in data that was based on a very 
liaited sample. An alternative conceptualization of this 
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phenomenon might be that investigators strive only to 
explain what they have encountered ( i.e. a small sample), 
and therefore ,their confidence would depend only on the 
consistancy of obtained resul~s and their ability to explain 
these results. 
The second component of a sufficiency heuristic, the seeking 
of parsimony, is useful in explaining a nu■ber of results-
Por example, the majority of subjects who encounter 
information confirming two causes, nevertheless do not 
recommend action relating to both of them. Also it was 
unlikely that a subject who had investigated all three cause 
would recommend three interventions. Thus, it was possible 
for subjects to ignore even information encountered, and 
this suggests that subjects try to arrive at a satisfactory 
account of the problem vith the fewest number of explanatory 
factors. Thus, a vide scope of search makes it more 
difficult to maintain a simple, single cause, 
explanation,and this is why ■ultiple actions are often 
reco■mended (e.g.when all three hypotheses have been 
explored). On the other hand,since it was relatively easy to 
dis■iss the first, rather weak, confirmation, relatively fev 
of these multiple recommendations i■plicated all three 
causes. 
An agreement response on the Opinion variable vas also more 
likely if the subject has attempted to devalue inforaation 
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which confirmed alternatives. Even so, the notion of 
disproportionate weighting discussed in an earlier section, 
is still required to explain agreement in cases where 
alternatives have not been adequately dismissed. 
Encountered 
different 
information may be dismissed in at least three 
ways. One strategy is what Elstein et al(1978) 
termed "overinterpretation" (originally mentioned as support 
for the use of a single cause heuristic). This amounts to 
assuming that inforaation of diverse origins has been 
brought about by the same cause. This "collapsing" of 
information would be relatiYely easy to accomplish if it was 
possible to posit a coamon cause post hoc, or if the pieces 
of information were general events which coamonly occur as a 
result of a wide variety of causes. This study, however, 
defined all causes a priori. In addition,the format of 
question selection emphasized the unique relevance of each 
piece of inforaation to a particular hypothesis, and the 
subjects• understanding of this is reflected in the 
differential impact of information on confirmed and 
alternative hypotheses. Thus, it is unlikely that many 
subjects were able to dismiss information in this manner. 
A second approach would be to attribute encountered 
information to some cause which had no relationship to the 
effect in question. For example,subjects who were informed 
that the student did not think that the material covered in 
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his course would be of any use to him in the future.may have 
been able to assume that this was due the nature of 
pre-established career plans.rather than because he vas 
bored. Since having non-related career plans is not 
generally considered a cause of failure. this information 
could be ignored in accounting for the failure. 
This approach runs up against some of the same objections 
mentioned previously with regard to "overinterpretation". 
Still. instructions for the task included the fact that not 
all inforaation was necessarily relevant to all hypotheses. 
This could have also been interpreted to mean that some 
information would not be related to any of the listed 
hypotheses~ 
The third strategy would be to redefine the sufficiency of a 
hypothesized cause. For example. a subject may be willing to 
admit that lack of interest in a course could account for 
failure in that course. and therefore. the certain discovery 
that the student had no interest would be taken as an 
explanation of the effect. In the case where the failure has 
already been imputed to a lack of language skills however, 
the certain discovery of lack of interest may no longer 
necessarily imply to the subject that it was also causally 
involved.because.it could be argued, that this condition 
does not inevitably result in failure. Thus. a subject when 
faced with definite evidence for more than one cause,may 
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succeed in eliminating one or more by adopting a more 
stringent definition. 
It is possible that this strategy accounts for the fact that 
a wide scope of search often results in none of the 
hypotheses being rated certain at the final evaluation. 
Subjects may have been convinced by both the second and 
third pieces of information, but after adopting the stricter 
definition of causality, both hypotheses remain likely ,but 
neither nov seems certain. 
As a final point,it should be noted that the lack of fora 
effect is not incompatible with the use of a sufficiency 
heuristic. In constrast to a single cause heuristic which 
vould determine the number of causes vhich are most likely 
to be operating, a sufficiency heuristic vould be concerned 
only vith the ainiaal number of causes that could be 
operating. Although the e~ent described in the quantitative 
form vas more likely than that described in the categorical 
form to have been multiply caused,both events had the same 
minimal causal estiaate. In other words, it vas possible 
that even the quantitative event had only one cause. 
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Closing Reaarks: 
rhe tacit assu■ption up to this point has been that an 
optiaal approach to investigating an event entails a 
thorough examination of all potential causes. This however, 
■akes no allowances for the specific goals of the 
investigator, or the practical costs involved in such 
thoroughness. 
There are obviously many · reasons for conducting an 
investigation • and not all necessarily require such a 
complete understanding. For example,if the goal vas to be 
able to recreate an event, (as opposed to having the pover 
to prevent its reoccurrence) • it would be enough to identify 
a single;(manipulatable) sufficient cause. 
Similarly. there might be quite specific interest in the 
involveaent of only certain causes. Thus.if in an 
investigation into an unusual accumulation of wealth, it was 
found that this was due, at least in part, to a 
misappropriation of funds, it is unlikely that there would 
then be any · interest in determining the additional 
contributions of hard work,business acumen or luck. 
But even in those cases vhere an investigation of all causes 
would be desirable, it is not likely that it would be 
practically attainable. First, it is not clear that it would 
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even be possible to draw up a complete list of potential 
causes. Assuming however, that an acceptably complete list 
could be produced, the difficulties associated with 
investigating each cause might well be overwhelming. In all 
probability, some sub-optimal fora of investigation would 
have to suffice, determined by such factors as the number of 
potential causes,their likelihood of involvement, their 
estimated contribution to the effect, and the ease vith 
vhich they could be explored or manipulated. 
Perhaps the most iaportant factor in determining the 
sufficiency of an incomplete solution is the relative costs 
of being in error. If errors can be corrected by 
subsequently taking into account previously overlooked 
factors,it vould usually be wasteful to examine every 
possibility initially. ~oreover, if it vas discovered that 
the original understanding of the event was inadequate,an 
examination of the failed intervention may Yery well provide 
clues 
thus 
as to the precise nature of the overlooked cause(s), 
adding in another vay, to the efficiency of this 
approach. 
Thus, a determination of the extent to which an 
investigation should be exhaustive should be achieved by 
balancing the costs of such an investigation against those 
incurred as a result of acting on incomplete information. 
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The behaviour of most sabjects in this study would, if 
applied to typical problems of this sort, probably result in 
reasonably efficient solutions. Within the context of this 
particular task,however,such behavior see■ed needlessly 
reckless. 
This is so for two reasons. First, although there were 
practical limitations which prevented a comprehensive 
investigation, there was never any emphasis placed upon 
arriving at a solution. In fact, the instructions were quite 
explicit in saying that some subjects would not have an 
opportunity to gain a complete understanding 6f the event, 
the implication being tha~ the inability to reach a decision 
might be an appropriate state. In spite of this, it was 
quite unusual for a subject to indicate either that he did 
not know if the Opinion state■ent was true, or that more 
infor■ation vas required before actions could be confidently 
recommended. 
The second point is that it was clear from the nature of the 
task, that an inadequate intervention would have 
unacceptable consequences. The scenario description stated, 
not only that the student vas in danger of failing his 
course, 
dismissed 
but that such a failure could lead to his being 
from the university and having to return to his 
native country. Given the severity of these consequences, 
and the fact that the failure could not be subsequently 
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corrected, it was essential that no causes be ignored. 
It ■ay have been that subjects were uncomfortable with 
suspending judgement. If this were the case, an acceptable 
solution in the presence .of inadequate information, would 
have been to take a cautious approach by recommending 
interventions relating to all potential causes. Although 
there was some tendency to recommend that a cause be acted 
upon even if it were not aeemed certain,nevertheless, it vas 
seldo■ recoamended that that all potential causes be acted 
upon. 
Another possibility is that subjects saw their actions as 
only an initial step; a way of beginning early action on 
those causes known to be operating, to be followed (were the 
investigation allowed to continaet by an investigation of 
causes whose involve■ent had not previously been determined. 
Although this may have been true of some subjects, it will 
not do as a general explanation since it is clear fro■ the 
results of the !atch variable that ,after receiving all 
three pieces of information, there vas disproportionately 
little interest in unexplored causes. 
In conclusion then, acting upon less than co■plete 
information ,although perhaps often the most reasonable 
approach, seems less defensible vhen there is an option to 
postpone judgement and where the consequences of an 
unsuccessful 
presence of 
marts the 
Apparently 
is strong 
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interYention would be irreparable. It is the 
both of these conditions in this study that 
behaviour of subjects as inappropriate • 
the tendency to act upon incomplete information 
even vhen the usual adYantages of this approach 
are not at a pre■ium. 
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!: Log-linear Analysis 
Log-linear analysis is a Ye~satile method of simultaneously 
dealing vith several dimensions of categorical data. It 
assumes,much like ~he ANCVA procedure that all departures 
from a "grand mean" (in this case, a mean f=equency) are due 
to the actions of certain "effects". 
For the sake of illustration, consi!er a two by two 
crosstabultion of Eye Colour (brown,blue) and 
Sex(male,female) for a sample of 100. In the absence of any 
effects, there would be a uniform or "mean" frequency (M) of 
25 for all cells. Departures from this figure of 25 could 
occur for three reasons. First, the numbers of males and 
females might not be equal. second, there might not be equal 
number of brown and blue eyed people. Third, there mignt be 
some interaction between the two variables. These effects 
are symbolized(using the first letter of the variable) as 
s,E,and SE respectively. Thus a complete ("saturat~d") 
description as to why cell frequencies differ from 25 
requires taking into account the s, E and SE terms. Taking 
the log of · frequencies allows an additive "model" to be 
stated as M + S + E + SE. 
In practical terms, a single term, such as E, implies that 
the marginal frequencies for that variable will not be 
equal. A first order interaction term such as SE implies 
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that the "odds-ratio" is not equal to 1, or in this case, 
that the proportion of blue-eyed males is not the same as 
the proportion of blue-eyed females. Similarly a second 
order interaction implies that the first order interaction 
between two of the variables is not equal at all levels of 
the third. 
Each model has associated with it a set of expected cell 
frequencies. The expected values for the saturated model are 
the same as the observed frequencies, but models with less 
teras have expected values that differ from those observed. 
In an attempt to see whether a table can be described more 
parsimoniously,terms may be removed and a "goodness of fit" 
statistic can be calculated to test the similarity of 
observed and expected values. This is usually done by using 
the Pearson Chi-square or Likelihood Ratio Chi-square, both 
of which are asymptotically distributed as chi-square. 
It can now be seen that the normal Pearson Chi-square test 
of independe~ce is just a special case of this technique. In 
terms of the example, it would be equivalent to testing the 
fit of the model M + s + E. If there is no interaction,or 
if this effect is ~ot very large, a reasonably good fit vill 
be obtained, signified by a statistic value which does a2t · 
exceed its critical valne~ 
Theoretically, any term or set ~f terms may be eliminated to 
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test for the fit of the remaining effects~ In practice 
however,only hierarchical models are considered. This means 
tha~, a term may not be eliminated if a higher order term 
containing that effect remains in the model. For example, 
the term E could not be removed fro• the model if the SE 
term remained. For this reason, it is sufficient to specify 
only the highest order terms which contain a particular 
effect. Thus ABC is understood to stand for a model which 
contains the terms M,A,B,C,AB,AC,BC, and ABC. 
If the intent of the an~lysis is to describe tbs effects of 
some set of "explanatory" variables on one or more 
"response" variables, then all terms vhich describe the 
relationships among the explanatory variables are included 
in all models tested. For example, in a four way table A by 
B by c by o, with o as a response variable,all models vould 
include the ABC ter■• rhe marginals of the explanatory 
variables are,in this case, considered to be fixed. 
When dealing vith a dichotomous response variable it is 
common to specify models in terms of the log of ratios, 
rather than the l~g of cell frequencies. For example, if the 
response 
and 10 
mariginal 
variable vas voting behavior with 30 people voting 
not voting, the "logit" or "log-odds" of the voting 
voula be the log of 3 (30 divided by 10). 
Estimated 
calculated 
odds for any 
based upon 
marginals or submarginals can be 
the fitted model, and correspond to 
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the ratio of expected values that would have been obtained 
had a non-logit analysis been conducted. 
Within the appropriate =onstraints then, the initial 
objective of a log linear analysis is to find the most 
parsimonious model that provides an acceptable fit to the 
data. A concise description of this technique can be found 
in Pienberg(1980) and a more elementary introduction is 
available in Knoke & Burke(1980t. 
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II: Booklet Form 
The following material was presented to subjects in the form 
of a~, page "scrambled" booklet. The wording on these pages 
represents the "categorical" form. Differences between this 
and the "quantitative" form are detailed in the Design 
section. 
Nineteen pages of redundant,misleading,or instructional 
material has not been included. Per example,the Recommend 
variables 
and Usefulness / were each repeated three times but differed 
only in their subsequent page references. ~isleading 
information included not only answers to various questions, 
but also the pages containing the saries of questions from 
which those answers could be chosen. Instructional pages 
were largely reminders about previous instructions such as 
how to rate the hypotheses and how to find information in 
the booklet. 
The four rating sheets have been included at the end of the 
booklet. 
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Consider the foll,ving situat i on. 
A university student fro ■ another country came to America to study. In 
his ho■e country, he had already taken a few courses, but these had all 
been in subjects that had particularly interested hia. 
As a 
student 
condition 
had to 
of being allowed to study in the onited States, the 
demonstrate that he was able to read and understand 
books written in English (although it was not university 
necessary 
English). 
level 
for him. to de■onstrate that Ile could understand spoken 
rhe student 
gat a part 
was not eligible for any financial aid but did manage to 
time job whicll earned hi• enough money to pay for his 
tuition and living expenses. 
In one course he has done po,rly on the ■id-term exa■, and if he does 
not do better on the final exa■ he will fail this course. 
A failure in any course would be very serious and could lead to the 
student having to leave the university and return to his native 
country. 
tour task 
poorly so 
is to decide, as bast as possible, why tile student is doing 
that appr~priate advice can be given to Ilia as to hov t o 
i mprove llis grades on the final. 
GO TO PAGE 4. 
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Tbe following possible caases (hypotbeses) were the ■ost frequently 
mentioned by previous people participating in this study. 
ASSU~E THAT ALL OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS HAVE BEEN RULED OUT and 
tbat only the foll,wing hypotheses need be considered in trying to 
figure out why the student is doing poorly in this course. 
1) The student had no interest in the course. He found it boring and, 
as a result, avoided studying it. 
2) The student altbougb able to read English, had trouble with 
listening co■prehension. Because of this, be couldn't anderstand what 
was said in lectures. 
3) The student's job was too ie■anding for bi■• As a result, he beca■e 
too exhausted and sick to stady properly. 
GO TO PAGE 5 
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First piece of information 
page 8 
The student works 20 hours per week at a job which involves quite a lot 
of heavy physical labor. 
Nov that you know this inforaation ,rate EACH of the potential causes 
a=cording to how likely it seems to you that it was involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid•term exam. 
OSE THE RATING SHEET; Page 2 for this. 
Reme•ber to make only one mark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so !it!l! (even if not 
=ertain) that you no longer have any serious doubt about it, £i~£le the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so Yn!it!!I (even if not 
impossible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
cross_out (x) the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 38 
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second piece of information 
page 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
9 
?he student's boss has often noticed that he looked tired and ill. 
Because of this, the student has frequently been sent ho ■e early to 
rest. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Row that you know this inforaation ,rate EACH of the potential causes 
!ccording to how likely it seeas to you that it vas involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid-term exam. 
USE THE RATING SHEET: Page 3 for this. 
Re■e■ber to ■ake only one ■ark on each line. 
rf you feel that any of the potential causes is so !lt~!I (even if not 
:ertain) that you no longer have any serious doubt about it, cii~l! the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so l£!l!~il (even if not 
impossible) that you no longer consider it to be a se~ious poss i bility, 
it2!!-2!!! (x) the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 23 
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Final piece of information 
page 11 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
?he student had great difficulty holding a conversation in 
English,largely due to the fact that he could not understand very much 
of what was being said to him. 
In lectures, he understood almost nothing of what the professor said. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Now that you knov this information. rate each of the potential causes 
1ccording to how likely it seems to you that it was involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid-term exaa. 
USE THE RATIBG SHEET; Page 4 for this. 
Remember to make only one mark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so !i!ilI (even if not 
certain) that you no longer have any serious doubt about it, ~it~!2 the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so y~!i!2!I (even if not 
imposs i ble) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibil i ty, 
~£2~~-2Y! (%) the letter of that cause . 
GO TO PAGE 26 
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If you were told for certain that so■e OTHER student has not been 
interested in the material covered in the course, what effect would 
this information have on tbe likelihood that this person's English was 
not good enough to understand what was said in the lectures? 
(Circle Onel 
1. It would ■ake it ■ore likely. 
2. It wouldn't have any effect; the two are unrelated 
3. It would aake it less likely. 
4. It would make it impossible. 
ibat effect would this information have on the likelihood that the 
student's job was ■aking hi■ too tired to study properly? 
(Circle Onel 
1. It would make it more likelyu 
2. It wouldn't have any effect; the twc are unrelated 
3. It vould aake it less likely. 
4. It would ■ake it iapossible. 
END OF TAS~ 
BAND IN !OUR PAPER 
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If you were told for certain that some 07BER student had trouble 
unde=standing the English used during lectures, what effect would this 
inforaaticn have on the likelihood that he was not interested in the 
course aaterial (i.e. and would not have been interested in it even if 
it was ~aught in his nacive language)? 
Circle one 
1. It would make it more likely. 
2. It wouldn't have any effect; the two are unrelated 
3. It would make it less likely. 
4. It would make it impossible. 
What effect would this information have on the likelihood that the 
student's job was making him too tir:d to studf properly? 
Circle one 
,_ It would make it aore likely. 
2. It wouldn' t have any effec~; t he t wo are unrelated 
3. It would make it less likely. 
4. It would make it impossible. 
END OP TASK 
HAND IR YOUR PAPER 
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If you vere told for certain that some OTHER stud~nt has been too tired 
to study properly, vhat effect would this informa~ion have on the 
likelihood that he vasn•t interested in learning the course material ( 
e•en if he had been feeling vell)? 
,. It vould make it more likely. 
2. It vouldn•t ha•e any eff~ct; the tvo are unrelated 
3. It vould make it less likely. 
4. It vould make it impossible. 
ihat effect would this information have on the likelihood that his 
English vas not good enough to unde~stand the lectures? 
1. It vould make it more likely. 
2. It wouldn't have any effect; the tvo are unrelated 
3. It vould make it less lik~ly. 
4. It vould make it impos3ible. 
END OF TASl 
HAND IN YOUR PAPER 
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Taking into account all three pieces of information that you have nov 
received, hov necessary vould it be to knov the answer to each of the 
following questions in order to understand vhy the student did poorly 
on the aid-term exam? 
Rate each of the questions from, to 5 as follows: 
,, totally useless 
2) not very useful 
3) somewhat useful 
4) very useful 
5) essential 
(put the number in the space at the end of each question) 
a) Bow often has the student read the university newspaper during 
lectures in this course?:--------
b) How ma~y other members of his family are also studying in A■P.rica at 
other universities?:-------
c) Bov entertaining does the student find it to watch American 
television (English sp~aking programs)?:-------
d) On average, how many tiaes per week doP.s the student buy his lunch 
at the cafeteria?:-------
e) on average, hov many hours sleep does the student get each night 
?:--------
fl on average, how many letters a week does he receive in the 
mail?:- - - ----
GO TO PAGE 32 
page 147 
Final pisce of informa t io n 
page 21 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The student 
during ttP. 
co•plaining 
often felt tired, and bas had headaches al■ost every day 
se■ ester. He bas, on several occasions, gone to doctors 
that these symptoas aade it impossible for hi• to 
concentrate properly on his schoolwork. 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kov that you knov t his inforaation rate each of the potential causes 
acco=ding to bov likely it seeas to you that it was involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid-tera exa■• 
USE THE RATING SHEET; Page 4 f~r this. 
Re■e9ber to make only one mark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so lilll:! (even if not 
certain) that you no lon~er have any serious doubt about it, ~i£~l~ the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so ~nli!~il (even if not 
iapossible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
~£~ll-2ll (XI the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 19 
page 148 page 22 
What is your opinion of this conclusion? 
If the student had had good English listeni ng comprehension sk i lls, he 
would no~ haYe done poorly on t he mi d-term exam. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Circle one 
,. almost certainly true 
2. probably true 
3. unknown 
"· 
probably false 
s. almost certai nly fals~ 
GO TO PAGE ijQ 
page 149 
Final Question Selection 
page 23 
Cboose ~n~ question from those below that you now feel would be most 
useful to have answered. 
a) Did the student spend less time studying the material from this 
course than other courses? 
b) Did the student have difficulty holding a conversation in English? 
c) Did the student have any health problems du~ing the 3emester 
commonly associated with fatigue? 
Write the letter of the question you vish ~o choose on the 
RATING SHEET; Page 4. 
If you vish to choose question A , GO TO PAGE 37 
If you vish to choose question B , GO TO PAGE 11 
If you vish to choose question c, GO TO PAGE 21 
pag e 150 
second piece of information 
page 2~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The student did significantly better on the part of the e1am that 
tested his knowledge of the textbook than he did on the part which 
examined material given in class. 
This pattern also occurred in another course which was divided into 
text and lecture based sections. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Now that you know this infor~ation rate each ~f the potential causes 
according to hov likely it seems to you that it was involved i~ causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid-term exam. 
OSE TH~ RATING SHEET; Page 3 for this. 
Remember to make only one mark on ~ach line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so !i!~!I (even if not 
certain) that you no longer have any serious doub~ about it, ~ir~!i the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so imli!~lv (ev~n if not 
impossible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
~t2§§_9JU. (X) the letter of that caus~. 
GO TO PAGE 23 
pag e 151 page 25 
What is your opinion of this conclusion? 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
If the student had been interested in the course, he would not have 
done poorly on the ■id-term. 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Circle one 
,. alaost certainly ~rue 
2. probably true 
3. unknown 
4w probably false 
s. alaost certainly false 
GO TO PAGE 39 
page 152 
First piece of infor■ation 
page 27 
The student is very guiet when in the company of American students but 
is ■ore talkative vhen vith other foreign students fro■ his ovn 
country. 
-~---------------------------------------------------------------
Nov that you knov this infor■ation rate each of the potential causes 
according to hov likely it see ■s to you tha t it vas involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the mid-term exa■• 
OSE THE RATING SHEET; Page 2 for this. 
Remember to ■ake only one mark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so li!!il (even if not 
certain) that you no longer have any serious doubt about it, £ir£l! t he 
letter of that c~~se. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so !!llillll (even if not 
impossible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
~t2fil!_QY1 (xi the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 38 
pag e 153 
First Question Selection 
page 29 
In order to investigate vhy the student did poorly on the ■ id-term 
exam, choose 2ni question fro■ those belov that you feel would be most 
useful to have ansvered. 
a) ias the course co■pulsory? Did the student have to take it as a 
requirement of his degree? 
b) ias the student quiet and not very talkative vhen in the company of 
American students? 
=I Did the student's part - time job involve long hours or strenuous 
vork? 
Write the letter of the question you vish to choose on the 
RA!ING SHEET~ Page 2. 
If you vish to choose question A, GO ro PAGE 33 
If you vish to choose question B, GO ro PAGE 27 
If you vish to choose question c, GO ro PAGE 8 
pa ge 154 page 32 
What is your opinion of this conclusion? 
If the student had not been so tired, he would not have done poorly on 
the aid-tera exam. 
Circle one · 
1. almost certainly true 
2. probably true 
3. unknown 
4. probably false 
5. alaost certainly false 
GO TO PAGE 41 
page 155 
First piece of information 
page 33 
Ihe - course vas compulsory. It had to be taken as a requirement of the 
studen t 's degree. 
Nov that you knov this information ,rate !ACB of the potential causes 
according to hov likely it see ■s to you that it vas involved in caus i ng 
the student to do poorly on the mid-term exaa. 
OSE THE RATING SHEET; Page 2 for this. 
Reaeaber ~o make only one mark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so likely (even if not 
=ertain) that you no longer have any serious doubt about it, £i£~1! the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so ~nlllill: (even i f not 
impossible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
ik2 2§_QJ!1 (x) the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 38 
pag e 156 
Second piece of infor■ation 
page 35 
rhe student feels that the subject ■atter of this course is unlikely to 
be of use to hi■ in the future. 
Nov that you knov this information ,rate EACH of the potential causes 
~ccording to hov likely it see■s to you that it vas in•ol•ed in causing 
the student to do pqorly on the mid-tera exam. 
DSE THE RATING SHEET; Page 3 for this. 
Re■e■ ber to make only one ■ark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so likelI (even if not 
=ertain) that you no longer ha•e any serious doubt about it, ~it~!§ the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is s o ~nli!~lI (eYen if not 
i■possible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious poss i bility, 
~t2ll-2.!!1 (x) the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 23 
page 157 
Final piece of information 
page 37 
rhe student has only put in Qn~_hslI the time studying this course that 
he has on the others. Be of .. en says that he finds the subject matter of 
the course so boring that vhen he sits dovn to study, he always puts 
the vork of other courses first. 
Nov that you knov this information ,rate EACH of the potential causes 
according to hov l i kely it seems to you that it was involved in causing 
the student to do poorly on the aid·term exam~ 
OSE THE RATING S!i'EET; Page 4 for this. 
ae ■e■ber to make only one aark on each line. 
If you feel that any of the potential causes is so li!!lI (even if not 
certain) that you no longer hare anr serious doubt about i t , £it£!! the 
letter of that cause. 
If you feel that any potential cause is so Ynli&t!I (even if not 
i■possible) that you no longer consider it to be a serious possibility, 
cross_out (x) the letter of that cause. 
GO TO PAGE 31 
pag e 158 
second Question Selection 
page 38 
Choose ll! question fro■ those below that you nov feel would be ■ost 
useful to have answered. 
at Did the student feel that t he inforaation taught in this course 
would probably not be useful to him in the future? 
bl Did the student do better on t he part of the exam based on 
infor■ation from the ~ext than he did on material testing co■prehension 
of what vas said in the lectures? 
=t Did the student's boss at work sver no t ice that he looked tired? 
Write the letter of the ques t ion you wish to choose on the 
RlfING SHEET; Page 3. 
If you vish to choose question A , GO TO PAGE 35 
If yon wish to choose question B, GO TO PAGE 2q 
If you vish to choose q.uestio n c, GO TO PAGE 9 
pag e 159 page 39 
If you feel that the booklet that you selected gave you enough 
information to fully unders~and why the student did poorly on the 
aid-tera exam,what could you suggest to help the student? In other 
words, what should the student do to make sure that he doesn't fail the 
final exam? 
If you feel that the booklet that you selected did NOT give you a 
chance to fully understand why the student did poorly on the aid-term 
exam, what information do you feel would have been required for such an 
understanding? 
GO TO PAGE 12 
AGE: 
--
SEX: ~ALE FEMALE 
(circle one) 
HYPOTHESES 
A. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibilit y 
NO INTEREST IN SUBJECT/ 
DID NOT WORK AS HARD 
AS COULD HAVE 
B. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibilit y 
ENGLISH COMPREHENSION 
POOR/COULDN'T UNDER-
STAND LECTURES 
C. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-r.ROSS OUT i f not 
serious possibility 
TOO TIRED/COULDN'T 
STUDY PROPERLY 
RATING SCALE pa ge 160 
PAGE: 1 
LIKELIHOOD RATINGS (make one mark on each 
1 i ne betv,een brackets) 
C I 
IMPOSSIBLE CERTAIN 
(-,---------,~--------, ) 
I~~OSSIBLE NEUTRAL CERTAIN 
IMPOSSIBLE I NEUTRAL CERTAIN 
AFTER FINISHING THIS PAGE, RETURN TO BOOKLET 
f'!.ATING SCALE 
page 161 
PAGE: 2 
FIRST QUESTION SELECTED: __ 
HYPOTHESES 
A. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
NO INTEREST IN SU&lECT/ 
DID NOT WORK AS HARD 
ft,S COULD HAVE 
8. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possib i lit y 
ENGLISH COWREHENSION 
POOR/COULDN'T UNDER-
STANf1 LECTURES 
C. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
- CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
TOO TIRED/COULDN'T 
STUDY PROPERLY 
LIKELIHOOD RATINGS (make one mark or. each 
line between brackets) 
c,------------------- ) 
IMPOSSIBLE ♦ NEJTRAL CERiJl:IN 
IMPOSSIBLE 
IWOSSIBLE 
I 
NEUTRAL 
NEJTRAL 
CERTAIN 
CERTAIN 
AFTEf'!. FitHSHHIG THIS PAGE, f'!.ETUf'!.N TO BOOKLET 
P.ATitJG SCALE 
page 162 PAGE: 3 
SECOND QUESTION SELECTED: __ 
HYPOTHESES 
A. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
NO H1TEREST IN SUBJECT/ 
DID NOT WORK AS HARD 
AS COULD HAVE 
B. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
ENGLISH COMPREHENSION 
POOR/COULDN'T UNDER-
STAND LECTURES 
C. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
TOO TIRED/COULDN'T 
STUDY PRCP ERL Y 
LIKELIHOOD RATINGS (make one mark on each 
1 i ne betv,een brackets) 
( J 
IMPOSSIBLE 
IMPOSSIBLE 
CERTAIN 
CERTAIN 
1) 
CERTAIN 
AFTER FINISHING THIS PAGE, RETURN TO BOOKLET 
FINAL QUESTION SELECTED: 
HYPOTHESES 
A. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
NO INTEREST IN SUBJECT/ 
DID NOT WORK AS HARD 
AS COULD HAVE 
B. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
ENGLISH COMPREHENSION 
POOR/COULDN'T UNDER-
STAND LECTURES 
C. -CIRCLE if have 
no serious doubt 
-CROSS OUT if not 
serious possibility 
TOO TIRED/COULDN'T 
STUDY PROPERLY 
P.ATING SCALE 
page 163 PAGE: 4 
--
LIKELIHOOD RATINGS (make one mark on each 
1 i ne bet\·1een brackets) 
(),-------~,~------'----, ) 
IMPOSSIBLE NEUTRAL CERTAIN 
<1--------~~----,----- ) 
IMPOSSIBLE NEUTRAL CERT~IN 
( I 
IMPOSSIBLE 
l 
NEUTRAL CERTAIN 
AFTER FINI SHH!G THIS PAGE, RETURN TO BOOKLET 
